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This dissertation seeks to describe and explain the 
changing nature of Nigeria's Southern African policy from 
i960 to 1979* Utilizing a case study of its Southern African 
relations during that period, the author argues that certain 
"power factors" or "capabilities" conditioned Nigeria's 
foreign policy. These capabilities include its population 
and size, military preparedness, political processes and 
leadership, and economic capacity. 
While the Southern African policy of the pre-civil 
war regime is seen as inconsistent and passive, the author 
maintains that there were significant and positive changes in 
that policy during the post Nigerian civil war era and that 
the changes were reflexive of corresponding changes in the 
above-mentioned capabilities as well as the external environ- 
ment. 
Looking at the history of the pre and post civil war 
regimes, it is concluded that Nigeria during its early years 
did not project a Southern African policy stance commensurate 
with its capabilities. In other words, the pre-civil war 
regime was unable to utilize Nigeria's capabilities to 
influence the racist regimes of Southern Africa nor their 
Western allies. However as the objective basis of its 
capabilities changed positively, the post civil war regimes 
became more aggressive in influencing the events in that 
region. 
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When Nigeria achieved independence in I960, it expected 
to play a leading role in Africa because of its size, large 
population and great economic potential. At that time, most 
of Africa, particularly Southern Africa, remained completely 
under the clutches of Western imperialists and South African 
white supremacists. The continent needed a leader who would 
he committed to effecting the demise of colonialism and 
racial injustice in Southern Africa. However throughout the 
first republic of Nigeria which collapsed on January 15, 
1966, the Government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
failed to live up to this expectation but rather maintained 
a "low profile" on most burning African issues. Under Sir 
Abubakar's leadership Nigeria adopted an extremely passive, 
and indeed conservative and cautious position in handling 
international affairs and thus was often referred to as "the 
sleeping giant of Africa.""^ 
Admittedly one can hardly say that the Abubakar regime 
Cited in C.S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian 
Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1969-), p. 90. 
1 
2 
was completely neutral about Africa. For instance, it re¬ 
jected any form of cooperation with the apartheid regime of 
South Africa; it played a visible role in the settlement of 
the Congo crisis; it opposed atomic tests on the African 
continent and in December i960, it severed diplomatic re¬ 
lations with France because of her persistent atomic tests 
2 m the Sahara. Nevertheless its overall foreign policy had 
been handled with a great deal of caution and ambivalence 
uncharacteristic of many African states whose activities had 
been openly aggressive on issues concerning decolonization 
and the liberation of territories controlled by racist regimes 
of Southern Africa. James Coleman thus asserts that the 
country's "comparative moderation [under Sir Abubakar] stands 
out in sharp contrast to the far more dramatic and militant 
assertiveness of certain smaller African states such as Ghana 
3 
and Guinea." 
Some eminent Nigerians were more critical of Sir Abubakar's 
foreign policy in general. In his observation during a major 
foreign policy debate in parliament in 1961, the Action 
Group Shadow Foreign Minister, Chief Anthony Enahoro declared, 
"Not only has this government in regard to foreign policy no 
2Ibid., pp. II8-I27. 
3 
^James S. Coleman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria" in 
Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., Foreign Policies 
in a World of Change (New York: Harper and Rowj 19o3)* P- 12. 
3 
target, not objective, but to my mind there is even no point 
of departure.... The foreign policy of this government gives 
L 
us nothing to work for, nothing inspiring." 
Many of these critics failed to realize that the 
Nigerian foreign policy under Sir Abubakar was in part a 
response to the internal and external environments in which 
the country had to operate. Therefore, in order to fully 
understand its dynamics, it is the intention of this reseacher 
to place it in the context of appropriate foreign policy 
theories. 
Theoretical Framework: 
A country's foreign policy refers to the totality of 
objectives, orientation and actions whereby a country seeks 
to cope with the external environment. These foreign policy 
components are of course reflexive of the sum total of those 
principles which have grown out of its history, political 
processes, leadership, economic and military capacity other¬ 
wise referred to as its capabilities.^ In other words foreign 
policy study projects a state's objectives, orientation, 
actions in response to the external environment and its 
capabilities. These components seem interrelated since the 
goals of foreign policy are a function of the political pro- 
l). 
House of Representatives (H.R.) Debates, September, 
1961 Session, p. 3^5- 
^K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for 
Analysis (New Jersey"! Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977)» PP* 168-1?1. 
4 
cesses by which they are formulated, just as the pattern of 
state action is guided partly by the objectives towards 
which it is focused, partly by its capabilities, and partly 
by the political processes through which it was selected.^ 
First and foremost, nation-states establish foreign 
policy objectives which serve as guiding principles in their 
dealings with the international political arena. Many of 
these objectives are met only by influencing the behavior of 
other nation states. 
Foreign Policy Objectives are classified into short 
range, middle range and long range objectives. 
Short range objectives otherwise described as "core" 
7 
values and interests of a nation are said to be goals of 
national self preservation and are often related to 
fundamental policy objectives of every sovereign nation. 
For some countries, particularly developing countries such as 
Nigeria, self preservation could be limited to the defense 
of national independence and territorial integrity of their 
home territory. For others like the United States and the 




°James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign 
Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free 
Press, 1969 ) , pi 167. 
^See Holsti, p. 145. 
g 
This may include any external territory deemed 
5 
Middle range objectives may include territorial ex¬ 
pansion. In other words, it could embrace all forms of 
self extention including colonialism, neo-colonialism and 
imperialism. On the other hand, they may portray the desire 
of certain countries to eliminate those forms of domination. 
According to Arnold Wolfers, some countries may seek for the 
"redress of legitimate grievances such as termination of un¬ 
just discrimination, emancipation from foreign control or 
imposition on others of an ideology or way of life."^ 
Most Third World countries are victims of foreign domination 
in one way or another and therefore are inclined to the 
pursuit of certain middle range objectives aimed at its 
eradication in order to achieve economic betterment for their 
peoples. 
Long range objectives or goals of national "self ab¬ 
negation" are designed to affect the environment beyond a 
nation's boundaries. Some states may place a higher value 
on international peace and pursue such an objective through 
international bodies like the United Nations. The,new 
sovereign states in particular look forward to the world body 
as an instrument for the achievement of world peace. 
Another vital component of a country's foreign policy 
is its orientation which relates to its "fundamental strategy 
necessary for self preservation, foreign investments and 
nationals. 
^Bonenau, pp. 177-179- 
6 
for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and 
aspirations and for coping with persisting threats."'*'0 
Orientation could be designed in the form of diplomatic 
coalitions and military alliances such as the NATO or WARSAW 
Pact. It could also be isolationist based on the premise 
that a political unit can best secure its independence by 
reducing transactions with other units in the external 
environment. 
There is also the strategy of nonalignment adopted 
mostly by Third World countries and viewed by them as spring¬ 
ing from, and being an integral part of the struggle against 
foreign domination. These countries including Nigeria, hold 
the conviction that nonalignment would foster independence 
in the sphere of foreign policy and national defense. In 
short, nonalignment defines the position of its adherents 
toward the Great Powers. The adherents spurn the idea of 
alliances which in many instances would force them to sacri¬ 
fice their own interest for the needs of Great Powers.0-0" 
It should be noted however that successful imple¬ 
mentation of a nation's foreign policy objectives and 
orientation depends largely on its capabilities or "elements 
12 
of national power including such indicators as: 
1. The Economy-actual and potential raw mineral re- 
11Ibid. , p. 115. 
12 
Elements of national power could be seen in Hans 
7 
sources, balance of trade, industrial productivity, 
Gross National Product etc. 
2. Military Capacity - the size of armed forces, weap¬ 
ons, skill and morale. 
3. Population (favorable and unfavorable) aspects, 
with emphsis on its relation to the G.N.P. and, 
4. Political processes and leadership, emphasizing the 
alertness and the expertness of the leaders and the 
nature of the political system. 
These elements are so significant in foreign policy 
13 formulation and execution that some analysts regard them 
as the determinants of foreign policy. They constitute those 
attributes, characteristics, conditions and processes which 
help to shape foreign policy acts. 
However, capabilities must be backed up by adequate 
"actions" in order to create effective foreign policy. In 
other words, capabilities must be in harmony with the ability 
14 
to command the obedience of other states. It means that 
capabilities or elements of national power do not function 
in isolation in the moulding of a state's foreign policy- 
toward another. Rather they function in coordination with 
vital components such as objectives, orientation and adequate 
'action' and skill in order to influence the target country. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1978), pp. 117-141. 
13 Howard Lentner, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative 
and Conceptual Approach (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill 
Publishing Company), pp. 105-135* 
^Holsti, pp. 168-181; William Olsen and Fred Sondermann, 
Nigeria's foreign policy between i960 and 1979 can be 
better understood if it is placed in the context of the fore¬ 
going theoretical framework with adequate attention given to 
(1) the country's foreign policy objectives and orientation 
during the various administrations within the period under 
study, (2) whom Nigeria had to influence, (3) what resources 
or capabilities it had at its disposal to do so, and (4) its 
successes and failures in utilizing these capabilities. 
Nigerian foreign policy objectives during the period 
under study could be classified into short range, middle range 
and long range. Its short range objectives were those related 
to the self preservation of its political unit and the defense 
of its national interests. This statement could easily lead 
to the risk inherent in the task of defining goals since 
"national interests" could be given different interpretations 
by various states. According to Arnold Wolfers, this term 
"can become so ambitious as to transform itself into a goal of 
unlimited self extention.However various Nigerian adminis¬ 
trations had clearly indicated that Nigeria had no ambition 
lé for acquisition of territories beyond its borders. There- 
The Theory and Practice of International Relations (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.), pp. 292-303• 
"^Rosenau, p. 178. 
■^Federal Ministry of Information, News Release, No. 
1538, December 1, 1976. 
9 
fore, assuming that a country's national interests are those 
delineated by its officials, Nigeria's 'core' interests 
meant the protection of the sovereignty and political in¬ 
dependence of its home territory, and also the promotion of 
its economic interests operating within the country.^ 
Various Nigerian administrations between i960 and 1979 
also pursued middle range objectives aimed at the elimination 
of all forms of colonialism on the African continent par¬ 
ticularly in Southern Africa. They believed that Nigerian 
independence would have little meaning unless the African 
continent was "free of domination, racial discrimination and 
18 
various indignities to which the African is subjected." 
Secondly, Nigeria aimed at the economic emancipation of 
the African continent. Hence it played a significant role in 
the creation of the Economic Community of West African States. 
It also put its weight behind the formation of the Organi¬ 
zation of African Unity (O.A.U.), whose members pledged their 
absolute dedication to the total liberation and emancipation 
20 
of African territories still under colonialism. 
19 
^Federal Nigeria 1:1 (1976), pp. 5-6; 16-19. 
l8Ibid. 
19 yIbid. , The ECOWAS would serve as a springboard for 
the establishment of an African Common Market. 
? 0 
Federal Nigeria (1976), pp. 16-19. See also C.S. 
Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy. 
10 
Nigeria's long range objective was based on the pro¬ 
motion of peaceful co-existence in the world through the 
United Nations and its affiliated bodies. Sir Abubakar 
stated this succinctly: 
We shall not allow our direct and primary interest 
in African affairs to blind us to the grave and 
vital issues which dominate the wider international 
scene. In the United Nations and in any other way 
possible, we shall direct our energies and influence 
to helping to reach solutions which will contribute 
to the, peace of the nations and well being of man¬ 
kind . 
In order to successfully pursue these foreign policy 
objectives, Nigeria adopted the strategy of non-alignment 
which, according to Sir Abubakar would "entail no diplomatic 
subordination to foreigners or abandonment of the nation's 
22 neutralist position in foreign affairs." In a major foreign 
policy speech in the House of Representatives on August 20, 
i960, Sir Abubakar made his administration’s position clear. 
He declared, 
We shall... endeavour to remain on friendly terms with 
every nation which recognizes and respect our 
sovereignty and we shall not blindly follow the lead 
of anyone; so far as it is possible, the policy on 
each occasion will be selected with proper inde¬ 
pendent objectivity in Nigeria's national interest. 
We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to 
associate itself-as a matter of routine with any of 
the power blocs. ^ 
21See C.S. Phillips, p. 41. 
22 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephants and the Grass: A 
Study of Non-Alignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), 
p. 63. 
23H.R. Debates, August Session, i960, pp. 289-290. 
11 
One would expect that because of this declared policy, 
Sir Abubakar's administration would relate to the Eastern 
bloc just as impartially as it would to the West. Instead 
it became excessively pre-occupied with the friendship of 
the Western nations, thus succumbing to compromises which were 
clearly at odds with Nigeria's foreign policy objectives and 
orientation. For instance the Abubakar administration re¬ 
fused to criticize Britain for her support of the Portuguese 
repression of Angolan freedom fighters when most African 
24 
countries did so; it refused to break up diplomatic re¬ 
lations with Britain, consistent with the resolution adopted 
the O.A.U. in 1965 when the Ian Smith regime in Zimbabwe 
illegally declared independence, even when most African 
countries with more economic interest at stake could do so;2^ 
it refused to train freedom fighters or accept the concept of 
2 6 
an armed liberation struggle in Southern Africa; but more 
importantly, the Abubakar administration accepted the Anglo- 
Nigerian Defense Pact which gave Britain the rights to estab¬ 
lish bases in Nigeria with transit rights and rights for 
tropical training facilities for her armed forces. In 
addition Sir Abubakar's government agreed to make available 
24 
Joseph Okpaku, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood (New 
York: The Third Press, 1972), pp. 57-69. 




to Britain facilities at Kano and Lagos airfields for both 
"assistance for the training and development of the armed 
27 
forces of the (Nigerian) Federation...." 
This action seemed irreconcilable with the country’s 
policy of non-alignment, a posture which is accorded more 
meaning largely in the military dimension of international 
politics. Many critics argued that it was not in the best 
interest of Nigeria to grant base rights to an imperial 
power which still maintained several colonies in Eastern and 
2 8 Southern Africa since it could use it as a launching pad to 
protect its interests in those territories including South 
20 
Africa in case of any nationalist opposition. y Others ar¬ 
gued that it would damage Nigeria's image among African 
governments which were committed to getting rid of colonial¬ 
ism in Africa.^0 
27 
Gordon J. Idang, "The Nigerian Political Process and 
Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the 
Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement." Unpublished Dissertation, 
State University of New York, 1969. 
2 8 
At that time Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Botswana, 
Tanganyika and Rhodesia were still British colonies. 
^C.S. Phillips, p. 36. 
30 
These were Ghana, Guinea, United Arab Republic and 
Mali. Nkrumah for instance sent proposals to the independent 
African states for an African High Command. But he excluded 
Nigeria because Ghana thought that it was "improper for an 
African state to enter into a defense agreement with any 
other state outside the African continent." The Service, 
December, i960. 
13 
On the other hand, Sir Abubakar's foreign policy 
orientation towards the Communist countries was that of cool¬ 
ness and restraint. His administration established a wide 
range of discriminatory policies which pushed Nigeria beyond 
the limits of credibility in regard to its often acclaimed 
principle of non-alignment. These include its refusal until 
December 1961, to repeal the ban placed on Communist litera¬ 
ture; the restriction on the U.S.S.R. to limit the number of 
their diplomats to ten while other embassies were left un¬ 
restricted as such; and discriminatory allocations of diplo¬ 
matic car plate numbers (five were allocated to the U.S.S.R., 
as against 100 each to the U.S. and U.K.).^ 
Nigeria's obsessive dependence on the West during the 
first republic was criticized by enlightened Nigerians who 
contended that the country could utilize its capabilities or 
elements of national power to defend its national interests. 
These elements included its giant size and population which 
afforded large markets for the industrialized world and a 
32 potential resource for a large military establishment. 
They also included its vast economic resources. For instance, 
unlike many developing countries, which are identified with 
one crop economy, Nigeria could boast of a large variety of 
■^C.S. Phillips, p. 58. 
32 
Reference to military establishment here indicates 
military personnel which could assist in the liberation of 
Southern Africa. 
14 
agricultural export products like cocoa, palm oil and kernels 
(Nigeria is the largest exporter of palm produce in the world), 
33 
rubber, cotton, peanuts and oil, and other tropical products. ^ 
Besides agricultural products, Nigeria exported considerable 
34- quantities of tin, gold, columbite, limestone and petroleum. 
It was also the contention of many progressive ele¬ 
ments in Nigeria that the country had dynamic leaders espe¬ 
cially in the South who fought relentlessly for Nigerian in¬ 
dependence. These leaders along with Nkrumah of Ghana had 
started fighting for the emancipation of Africa from colonial 
rule long before the dawn of independence of the various 
33 African countries. 
However as much as the successful implementation of a 
country's foreign policy depends on its elements of power, 
these elements must be backed up by effective and skillful 
actions in order to influence a target country. In the case 
of Southern Africa Nigeria's target was the West and their 
outpost South Africa. Until the emergence of the oil sector 
as predominant in the Nigerian economy, the probability of 
the government utilizing its resources to influence the 
target countries in order to limit the impact of discrimi- 
33 U.S. Agency for International Development, Africa: 
Economic Growth Trends (Statistics and Report Division, 
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, May 1972), p. 26. 
34 Business International, "Nigeria: Africa's Economic 
Giant." Business International Corporation, January, 1979» 
P. 37- 
33 
K.B.C. Onwubiko, History of West Africa, Book II 
15 
nation and colonialism in Southern Africa was very low. This 
was partly because Nigeria feared the disutility of such a 
measure since it needed Western technology, investments, 
goods and services, as much as the West needed its agricul¬ 
tural and mineral products. 
Nigeria's excessive reliance on the West during the 
Abubakar administration could be traced back to the country's 
colonial history and legacy. Nigeria was a British Colony 
and like most ex-British colonies in Africa, its foreign 
policy making capability was limited by the legacies of 
British colonialism. Apart from bequeathing some elements 
of Western culture, the British colonial administration left 
behind educational, administrative, legal and financial 
systems. Consequently Nigeria's economy became struc¬ 
turally tied to Britain specifically, and to the West in 
general. Thus economic dependence with its attendant super¬ 
imposed values and institutions eliminated any tendency on 
the part of Nigeria to antagonize or confront the Western 
bloc. Hence Nigeria could not utilize her capabilities to 
influence events in Southern Africa. 
There were also various internal constraints on Nigerian 
capabilities during most part of the first independence decade. 
(Jurong, Singapore: F.E.P. International Ltd.), p. 358. 
o zf 
J Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African 
States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977). PP• 177-17Ô. 
16 
Within the country itself, there were sectional struggles by 
37 the regions for the control of the Federal government and 
for the possession of greater shares of the national ’cake.' 
Underneath this whole struggle was ethnic rivalry which 
dominated all aspects of the Nigerian political scene. 
Quite often, it precipitated mistrust, violence and dis¬ 
turbances especially during elections and eventually led to 
the overthrow of the Abubakar regime on January 15, 1966 by 
a small group of army officers. These officers accused Sir 
Abubakar of ineptitude in domestic and foreign affairs.A 
military government assumed power under the leadership of 
General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Ibo officer from Eastern 
Nigeria. 
Until his overthrow in another military coup in July 
1966, General Irons! was too preoccupied with serious domestic 
issues to play any vigorous role in foreign policy. His regime 
was very unpopular with the Northerners who were always opposed 
to Southern domination. He gradually de-emphasized Nigeria's 
long standing regional semi-autonomy and tried to create a 
unitary state. 7 He also planned for rapid unification of 
37 There were four regions: The Northern Region 
(dominated by the Hausas); the Western Region (dominated by 
the Yorubas); the Eastern Region (dominated by the Ibos); and 
the mid Western Region (dominated by the Ibos and the Uhrobo 
peoples). 
o o 
J Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Random House 
Inc., 1970) , p. 285• 
•^The post independence constitutional provision gave 
17 
regional civil services, an institution greatly cherished by 
the Northerners as a safeguard against Southern domination.^ 
But the immediate cause of his downfall was his haste in pro¬ 
claiming a new unitary Constitution by his Decree #34 (May 
24, 1966).^ This was a slap in the face of the Northerners 
who felt that it was no longer possible for them to control 
the federal government. 
With the overthrow of General Irons!, General Yakubu 
42 Gowon, a Northerner emerged as the next Head of State. 
Initially, General Gowon was unable to establish sovereignty 
over Eastern Nigeria inhabited predominantly by the Ibos who 
feared systematic extermination under a federal government 
43 controlled by the Northerners. v The developments that 
the regional governments nullifying power over the imple¬ 
mentation of certain treaties. Section 69 stipulates that 
any law enacted by the federal government for the purpose of 
implementing any international treaty, convention or agree¬ 
ment, concerning matters falling within the exclusive or con¬ 
current powers of the federal government "shall not come into 
operation in a region unless the Governor of that region has 
consented to its having effect (Black and Thompson, p. 389)- 
Hence it was common for regional Premiers to make foreign 
policy statements contrary to the position of the federal 
government. 
40 
See John Ostheimer, Nigerian Politics (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1973)» p. 62. 
42 
Department of State, "Nigeria," Background Notes, 
1975, P. 3- 
43 Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story (Baltimore: 
Penguin, 1969). Chapter 6. 
18 
followed led to secession of Eastern Nigeria, later known as 
Biafra, from the Nigerian federation and subsequently to a 
bloody civil war which lasted from July 6, 1967 to January 
15, 1970. 
The Civil war seriously affected Nigeria's external 
relations. Western influence was reduced in exchange for a 
considerable increase in Soviet presence. This was due to 
the refusal of Nigeria's Western friends to support Nigeria 
,LL 
at the initial stage of her war against Biafra. 
Alternatively Nigeria cultivated the friendship of the 
Soviet Union which consequently backed her with massive 
military and economic aid in order to successfully prosecute 
its war against Biafra. Generally it seemed reasonable to 
contend that Soviet aid was an important element in the 
federal government's victory over the secessionists. Thus 
the civil war experience removed the inhibition of the 
46 
Nigerian Government towards Communist countries and its 
total dependence on the West. Furthermore, with the boost 
44 
Radio Moscow, quoted in West Africa, 1970» P- 122. 
45 Ibid. 
At independence, Nigeria was suspicious of Communist 
countries and their influence. Sir Abubakar regarded 
Communism as an evil and once declared, "I and my colleagues 
are determined that while we are responsible for the govern¬ 
ment of the federation of Nigeria and for the welfare of its 
people, we shall use every means in our power to prevent the 
infiltration of Communism and Communist ideas into Nigeria." 
(Quoted from Sam Epelle, ed., Nigeria Speaks; Speeches of 
Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Lagos: Longmans, 1964), 
p. 10. 
19 
given to the Nigerian economy by the oil boom from the early 
1970s, a major constraint in policy making was reduced. 
The military regime of General Gowon first embarked on 
a "low profile" African policy due to the civil war. However 
after its successful completion in 197°» Nigeria assumed a 
dynamic foreign policy stance, particularly in relation to 
Un 
African affairs. In effect, the post civil war regimes ' 
48 
acted commendably in the field of foreign relations. They 
abandoned the lukewarm approach to international problems and 
elected to make their position known even when such position 
was in direct conflict with the West. In other words, the 
period between the collapse of the first republic of Nigeria 
in 1966 and the completion of the civil war in January 1970» 
marked the end of an era and the beginning of another in the 
history of Nigeria's external relations. Therefore the pur¬ 
pose of this study is to describe, analyze and compare the 
Southern African policy of Nigeria's first independent regime 
I96O-I966 to subsequent regimes, 1967-1979* 
47 'These included the administrations of General Gowon 
(1970-1975)» Murtala Muhammed (1975-1976), and Olusengun 
Obasanjo (1976-1979)* 
UP) 
For instance in 1972, Nigeria rejected the British 
manoeuvre with regard to point by point majority rule in 
Zimbabwe, but later participated in negotiations leading to 
that country's independence in March I98O. The post civil 
war regimes also helped to settle the Angolan crisis in 1975» 
thus contributing immensely to the demise of colonialism and 
imperialism in Angola. For details of these commendable 
actions, see Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of 
African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), PP* 163 
195* 
20 
Hypothesis ; There were substantial and positive changes 
in Nigeria's African relations between 1970 and 1979. These 
changes resulted from the dynamic leadership of the post 
civil war regimes and also the increased economic and mili¬ 
tary capacity of Nigeria. The hypothesis stems from the 
assumption that "change in foreign policy might be generated 
by fundamental changes in capabilities conceptualized as 
4Q 
determinants of Nigerian foreign policy.  * * 7 
A case study of Nigeria's foreign policy toward Southern 
Africa is utilized to demonstrate the specific nature of the 
changes in policy orientation and implementation between the 
pre-civil war and the post civil war eras in Nigerian history. 
The researcher has embarked on this aspect of study because 
although a number of extant studies of Nigeria's foreign 
policy in general have been done yet no serious research about 
its Southern African relations has been undertaken. In 
addition, Southern Africa has always posed a dominant problem 
for African states as well as a major issue in international 
relations. 
Various materials including journals, periodicals, news¬ 
paper articles and pamphlets, government publications, bro¬ 
chures and interviews with officials of the Nigerian Mission 
at the United Nations and the Nigerian Consulate in New York 
are utilized in this study. There is also an exhaustive 
4 Q 
^Charles Kegley, Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, American 
Foreign Policy: Patterns and Process (New York: St. Marins 
Press, 1979), PP- 423-424. 
21 
examination of Nigeria's Southern African Policy in the U.N. 
and the O.A.U. since all Nigerian administrations pledged 
their unwavering support for these organizations and also 
indicated their willingness to utilize them as much as 
possible to achieve their foreign policy objectives. 
Chapter II deals with the capabilities or determinants 
of Nigeria's African Policy and how changes in some of these 
factors could result into corresponding changes of the 
country's African policy. 
Chapter III deals with Nigeria's policy towards Southern 
Africa (I96O-I966). This will also include the utilization 
of the international agencies (U.N. and the O.A.U.) as a 
forum for explaining her position on Southern African issues. 
Chapter IV portrays a general perspective of Nigeria's 
relations with Southern Africa (1967-1979) including its 
utilization of the O.A.U. and the U.N. to achieve its 
objectives while chapter V gives a summary of the study and 
an update on the post military regime. 
CHAPTER II 
ELEMENTS OF NIGERIAN POWER 
It was argued in the last chapter that the amount of 
influence wielded by a country over others depends consider¬ 
ably on the capabilities which could be mobilized in support 
of its foreign policy objectives and orientation. To put it 
another way, the successful implementation of a country's 
foreign policy is dependent partially at least on the avail¬ 
able capabilities described as the determinants of foreign 
policy. However what is more crucial is the ability of a 
country to skillfully mobilize these capabilities in order to 
influence a target country. 
The research also posited that significant and funda¬ 
mental changes in one or some combination of the capabilities 
conceptualized as the determinants of foreign policy might 
generate corresponding foreign policy changes. These theories 
are intended to provide a premise for a better understanding 
of the African policy positions of the pre and post civil war 
regimes in Nigeria. The purpose of this chapter therefore 
is (1) to discuss the capabilities or elements of power at 
the disposal of various Nigerian administrations during the 
period under study, and their impact on Nigerian foreign policy. 
22 
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(2) To demonstrate how changes in these capabilities pro¬ 
duced a corresponding changing pattern of Nigeria's African 
policy after the civil war, and (3) To highlight the suc¬ 
cesses or failures of the various administrations in their 
attempt to mobilize these capabilities to achieve foreign 
policy objectives. 
Nigerian elements of power or capabilities included its 
economic capacity, military preparedness and political leader¬ 
ship. These factors underwent considerable changes after the 
civil war. For instance, the post civil war era experienced 
a more dynamic leadership, increased military preparedness 
and a growing economic capacity. It is important first of 
all to discuss these capabilities, emphasizing the changes 
that occured in the post civil-war era. This will be followed 
by an analysis of the successes or failures of the various 
administrations in utilizing their capabilities. 
Economic Capacity 
Nigeria's capabilities could be measured in terms of 
its natural resources. It possessed a larger variety of 
agricultural products than many African countries."*" Some of 
these products included palm-produce, groundnuts, cocoa, 
rubber, and cotton. Its mineral products included tin, gold, 
columbite, limestone and oil. Oil, which is an indispensable 
"’"Department of State, "Nigeria" Background Notes, May, 
1975, P. 1. 
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material was by far the country's most important resource. 
Production by 1976 exceeded two million barrels a day, making 
2 
Nigeria the sixth largest exporter of oil in the world. 
According to students of International Relations, natural 
resources such as those possessed by Nigeria could constitute 
a stable factor that exert an important influence upon the 
power of a nation in regard to other nations. Permanent 
scarcity of them could result into permanent weakness in 
international politics, while their unlimited availability 
could create a positive impact on national power or shifts 
in the distribution of power. 
Despite the fact that Nigeria possessed these resources, 
the Abubakar regime lacked the skill to mobilize them in 
support of its foreign policy objectives. With its heavily 
Western orientation, the country's economy maintained signifi¬ 
cant trade ties with Western countries particularly Britain 
which incidentally, was a crucial target for its influence 
purposes. In 1961 81.8 percent of Nigeria's imports came 
from Western countries including Japan, while 92.6 percent 
of her exports went to these countries. By way of contrast, 
trade relations with the East European countries and China 
were not spectacular. (See Table I, p. 25) 
2 
Business International, "Nigeria: Africa's Economic 
Giant," Business International Corporation, January, 1979, 
P- 37. 
-^See Hans Morgenthau, pp. 120-123; Howard Lentner, 
pp. 29, 58. 
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SOURCE: Olajide Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States, p. 176. 
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Western orientation during the Abubakar administration 
was more apparent in relation to aid and investments from 
overseas. Under that administration, Nigeria received 
virtually all its foreign aid from Western sources or in- 
LL 
directly through the World Bank and the United Nations. In 
addition, approximately eighty percent of the 200 million 
pounds sterling in overseas investment within the country was 
British.Therefore Nigeria’s economic dependence on the 
West negatively affected its exercise of influence since 
"the success or failure of acts of influence is the extent to 
which there are needs between two countries in any influence 
relationship."^ 
However due to the civil war experience, the over¬ 
whelming Western influence became eroded. Table I shows a 
considerable rise in Nigeria's trade with the East European 
countries, and a continuing decline in its trade with Britain 
during the post Abubakar regimes. 
Above all, the emergence of the oil sector in the 1970s 
as predominant in the counrty's economy became instrumental 
to the dramatic changes in its economic growth and influence. 
4 Douglass Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and 
Economic Alignment," Journal of Modern African Studies 2:2 
(1964), p. 241. 
5Ibid. 
/r 
Holsti, p. 172. 
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The export of petroleum products alone reached $9*1 billion 
in 1976 and thus accounted for 9° percent of export and 
7 
foreign exchange earnings that year. In 1979» the Gross 
National product rose to $27-3 billion. This entails a 
fourteen-fold increase in total output of the country's 
economy between i960 and 1979* This also indicates a growth 
g 
rate of ten percent and per capita income of $333* 
Military Preparedness 
As an element of national power, military preparedness 
is dependent upon the quantity and quality of men and military 
equipments and their distribution among different branches of 
the military complex. But more importantly, it requires that 
a military establishment be capable of defending its foreign 
Q 
policies. The following paragraphs are designed to demon¬ 
strate the increasing military capacity of Nigeria which 
considerably helped it to pursue its foreign policy objec¬ 
tives. 
Before the civil war, Nigeria had a ceremonial army of 
about 10,000 officers professionally under arms of whom 8000^ 
7 
'Department of State, "Nigeria," Background Notes, 
1977, P. 4. 
^West Africa (April 9, 1979)» P* 613. There will be 
a detailed analysis of Nigeria's mobilization of economic 
capability toward the end of this chapter. 
^Morgenthau, pp. 126-128. 
"*~°William Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics 
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were in the army which was principally light infantry, with 
British equipment, no amour, and little artillery support.'1'1 
The small navy which was British trained had acquired seven 
crafts from Britain at independence, and a few more were 
subsequently bought. The airforce was virtually non existent 
at independence but was subsequently formed and trained by 
12 West Germany. 
However the war to end Biafran secession led to the 
enlistment of several thousands of officers. Thus at the 
end of the war in January 1970» the numerical strength of the 
country's military was estimated at between 240,000 and 
250,000. v Both the navy and the airforce grew immensely. 
The navy increased ten-fold from 500 officers and men in 1961 
to 5000 in 1971 while the airforce recorded a personnel 
strength of 7°00 officers.1^ 
By the end of the civil war, the Nigerian army was 
equipped with 45 saladin and 15 AML-6OI-9O armoured cars; 25 
Ferret and some Fox Scout cars; 12 Saracan armoured personnel 
carriers; 76mm, 25-pounder, 105mm and 130mm guns/howitzers; 
2 0mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. The navy was equipped with 
London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1969)» p. 67. 
11New__Africa (October 1979)» p. 29. 
12Ibid. 
13 Africa Contemporary Record. 197I-I972, p. B650. 
14 
Julius Emeka Okolo and Winston Langley, p. 214. 
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a submarine chaser, several seaward defense boats, a landing 
craft, and a few fast armed patrol boats acquired from the 
Soviet Union.^ The inventory also included one anti¬ 
sub-marine warfare/anti aircraft frigate; two corvettes; two 
large patrol crafts and seacat surface to air missiles were 
. 16 on order. 
The airforce possessed 36 combatant aircrafts, one light 
bomber Squadron with four 11-28; two ground attack fighters, 
air defense squadrons with 12F-27, one F-28, Six C-130H, 
seven C-4-7, one DC6 and 6 Noratlas; one search and rescue 
helicopter squadron with three whirl wind, four B0-105 and 
two Puma; three training service squadrons with four MIG-15s, 
20 Bulldogs, 10P-14-9D, 23D0-27/-28, three Navajo and eight 1- 
17 29, and Six Alouette III helicopters. 
Military expenditure also increased considerably due to 
the civil war. Annual expenditures indicate that while in 
1964/1965, Nigeria spent $43*6 million (30 percent of total 
national budget), on defense, in 1968-1969* the peak of the 
civil war, it spent $256 million (61/ of the national ex¬ 
penditure), and in 1969-1970* it spent $4-33 million, 64- per- 
18 cent of total national expenditure. 
15Ibid. 
l6A.C.R. (1977-1978), p. B74-1. 
~*~^The Military Balance 1977-1978 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies). 
18 
Harold D. Nelson, et. al. , Area Handbook for Nigeria 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 
pp. 4-00-4-09. 
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After the civil war, Nigeria still maintained a high 
military expenditure. For instance 1971-1972 estimates were 
$757 million which raised speculations about Nigeria's lead- 
19 
ing role in the projected O.A.U. High Command 7 if it 
materialized. Then in 1979» the defense budget rose sharply 
to $1.75 billion, which was second only to South Africa in 
2 0 Africa South of the Sahara. In overall military manpower, 
Zaire ranked second to Nigeria with 50,000 troops, while 
Ethiopia ranked third, with 44,57° soldiers. Ghana maintained 
21 
the fourth place with about 18,000 troops. 
Political Leadership 
The quality of political leadership in any given polit¬ 
ical system can dictate the nature of national goals and 
aspirations pursued by the government in regard to its external 
relations. It influences tendencies to mobilize other capa- 
22 
bilities needed to conduct foreign policy. According to 
■^For details of the O.A.U. High Command, see Africa 
Contemporary Record, 1972, p. B658. Also see Claude Phillips, 
The Development of the Nigerian Foreign Policy. 
2°New Africa (October 1979), P* 29. 
21Africa Report 19 (July-August, 1974), p. 25. South 
Africa has far smaller army than Nigeria but maintains the 
highest per capita defense expenditure and the most modern 
and extensive military equipment in Africa. Refer to the Report 
of the Special Committee Against Apartheid: Review of the 
Developments in Military Collaboration with South Africa. 
(U.N. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, 
Centre Against Apartheid, July 17, 1978). 
22 
Howard Lentner, p. 208. 
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Howard Lentner, a high level of mobilization of capabilities 
on behalf of national goals needs a leader who is confident 
in himself and who articulates sentiments and expressed 
23 
emotions and ideals that lead people to follow. ^ It also 
requires leadership functions which stimulate the development 
of attachment to the country by its citizens, and successful 
solution of the country's domestic problems which assures a 
propensity to support the authoritative decisions of the 
leaders and a sustained support for the implementation of the 
country's policies. 
In order for Nigeria to be able to mobilize its existing 
capabilities, its leaders should (1) be willing, able and 
courageous enough to make necessary decisions in foreign policy, 
(2) maintain unanimity of the political leadership in its 
commitments to the achievement of foreign policy objectives, 
(3) work assiduously to secure internal cohesion and (4) strive 
to stay out of the neo-colonial structure in spite of enormous 
pressures and temptations. In order to understand the concept 
of Nigeria's leadership as an "element of national power," 
this author has chosen to discuss in detail, the leadership 
roles of the pre-and post civil war regimes, emphasizing their 
successes or failures in the mobilization process. 
When Nigeria became independent on October 1, i960 as 
a federation of three regions, Northern, Western and Eastern, 
23 Ibid., p. 209. 
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under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary system 
of government, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was elected its 
first Prime Minister. To understand the basis of his 
political behavior, it may be essential to mention among other 
things that he was brought up in the traditional Islamic en¬ 
vironment in Northern Nigeria. He was a devout Muslim and 
feudal aristocrat, and by nature, extremely conservative. 
Throughout his tenure of office as Prime Minister, he retained 
pro-British tendencies which resulted in a lack of an in¬ 
dependent foreign policy posture. The implication of this is 
that Abubakar's leadership became conservative and reactionary. 
Thus when Ghana under Nkrumah was aspiring to leadership of all 
Africa and associated with more radical groups of states, 
Nigeria was much less ambitious and associated with more 
24- 
conservative states. 
Under a federal system of government, Sir Abubakar was 
faced with serious problems that arose from inter-regional 
differences. In the first place, there were three major 
political parties (N.C.N.C., N.P.C. , and A.G.), each, en¬ 
trenched in a region. But since none of the parties won 
enough seats in the 1959 election which was held to create the 
first independent government of Nigeria, the Federal Government 
became a coalition of two of them (NPC and NCNC) with the Action 
Group (AG), forming the official opposition in parliament.2^ 
24- 
Ibid., p. 36. 
2^In the 1959 election, the N.P.C. won 14-2 seats, N.C.N.C. 
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But the coalition parties were diametrically different in 
political orientation. For instance, while the Northern 
People’s Congress (N.P.C.), Sir Ahubakar's party, was very 
conservative and was controlled by the Northern Regional 
Government, with its membership limited to persons of Northern 
origin, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.) 
was very radical, nationalistic and liberal. On this point, 
Okolo and Langley asserted: 
The Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.) urged the 
desirability of gaining membership in the (British) 
Commonwealth; of joining the Western bloc, and by 
extention disavowing a non-alignment of neutralist 
posture; of refusing and avoiding ties with or aid 
from, the Soviet bloc; and of postponing talks of 
African Unity. The N.C.N.C. on the other hand, 
while initially vague on matters pertaining to 
Pan Africanism, was vigorously opposed to 
identification with any bloc; forcefully, urged a 
policy of non-alignment... and supported the idea 
of a federation of West African states.26 
Partly, as aresult of the diverse foreign policy positions 
of the coalition parties, and partly due to political con¬ 
straints imposed by regionalism, the foreign policy making 
capability of the federal government was hampered. 
Secondly, under the federal structure, political con¬ 
straints were created by constitutional provision which allowed 
regional governments to nullify the implementation of federal 
government treaties. By implication, any region could refuse 
the implementation of a treaty signed by the federal govern¬ 
ment "unless the Governor of that region has consented to its 
82, Action Group, 73, and independent candidates, 8. 
^Julius Okolo and Winston Langley, op. cit., p. 326. 
3^ 
having effect."2^ 
On the basis of a constitutional provision that "both 
federal and regional governments had concurrent jurisdiction 
over industrial development," the regional governments under¬ 
took extensive economic tours abroad for the purpose of 
attracting investments to their regions. While on these tours, 
the Premiers sometimes made foreign policy statements contrary 
to the foreign policy stance of the federal government. For 
instance in i960, the Premier of Eastern Nigeria, Dr. Okpara 
took a jibe at the federal government by cabling a congratu¬ 
latory message to Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana praising him for his 
views on the unity of Africa and expressing the hope that other 
2 8 
African leaders would follow his example. That same year, 
the Western Nigerian government established a "Western 
Nigerian Information and Industrial Development Office" in 
New York City. However the federal Government ordered it to 
2Q 
be closed down. 
On his part, the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu 
Bello, while on official tour of the Arab nations of the Middle 
East in 1961, had extended official invitations to the Heads 
of the Moslem states. This was an encroachment on the Federal 
Government jurisdiction. The enraged Nigerian press called on 
27 
'Black and Thompson, p. 389. 
2 8 
Ituen Bassey, "Nigeria's Foreign Relations: A Study 
of the Factors Influencing Nigeria's Foreign Relations After 
Independence, (Unpublished Dissertation, St. Louis University, 




the Prime Minister to discipline the Premier. Again, in 
1965, he openly declared that "the state of Israel does not 
exist" despite the fact that Israel enjoyed the recognition 
31 of the Federal Government. Such divergent statements gave 
Nigeria the image of a state that "speaks with too many 
voices. 
Thirdly, the Abubakar administration was plagued by 
domestic disturbances which eventually ended in the collapse 
of the first republic and consequently a civil war. First of 
all, there was the census controversy of 1963 in which each 
region harbored deep suspicion that the other regions had 
much smaller population than it had claimed in the census of 
1962.-^ The same attitude prevails today making it difficult 
to discern the appropriate population figures of Nigeria. 
Major crisis also erupted in Western Nigeria in 1965^ 
which resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency in 
that region. The incident was precipitated by dissatisfaction 
3°VJest African Pilot (Lagos), June 27, 1961, (Editorial 
Column). 
^Africa Diary (September 18-24, 1965), p. 2518. 
-^Claude Phillips, op. cit., pp. 80-87> James Coleman, 
op. cit., pp. 390-391* 
33 ̂For the details of the census controversy, see Kenneth 
Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 




with the result of the rigged Western Nigeria election in 1965. 
The regional election was followed by extensive popular dis¬ 
order which the Prime Minister seemed to lack the power to 
arrest. The situation was still fluid when the military siezed 
power in January 1966, giving rise to the untimely death of the 
33 
Prime Minister. ^ 
Dr. Nkrumah summarized the Nigerian situation when on a 
special broadcast in his tribute he said, 
Sir Abubakar died a victim of forces he did not under¬ 
stand and amartyr to a neo colonialist system he was 
merely the figurehead....It is right that we should 
honour his memory. But it is equally important that 
we should understand the factors which brought about 
his death. His early life was spent in Northern 
Nigeria where neo-colonialism, in its earliest form 
of indirect rule, had been developed and perfected 
since the beginning of this century. Subconsciously 
the ruling classes of Northern Nigeria came to look 
upon British imperial power as the source of their 
authority and they considered independence merely as 
a method of continuing indirect rule over a larger 
area by other means. Here it was that the inherent 
inconsistencies and contradictions of neocolonialism 
showed themselves. Those who inherited power in 
Nigeria assumed that they had only to copy the British 
parliamentary system in every detail to ensure freedom 
and justice in Nigeria. In fact by doing so, they 
only transfered to the parliamentary stage the under¬ 
lying contradictions of Nigeria as colonially con¬ 
stituted. What Sir Abubakar and his Government 
succeeded to was an artificial state created to suit 
the needs of early 20th century imperialism....On 
independence... the Federal Government was left with 
the shadow of authority, but real power rested with 
the regions. Behind this facade of different forms, 
imperialism sought to perpetuate its interests. Sir 
Abubakar and his Goygmment therefore faced an 
impossible task.... 
3 3 
-^William Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 71* 
~^West Africa (January 29, 1966), p. 133- 
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After the end of the civil war, there were some im¬ 
portant changes which made Nigerian leadership and its 
machinery for foreign policy formulation more effective. 
General Gowon had earlier in 196? reorganized the regions in¬ 
to twelve states, each of which was too small and too weak 
politically and economically to question the authority of the 
Federal Government or defy it. The federal Government also 
centralized all aspects of foreign policy under its juris¬ 
diction. Thus no longer can regional leaders make important 
foreign policy pronouncements that gave the country the re¬ 
putation of "speaking with too many voices." 
Moreover the Constitution (suspension and modification) 
Decree of March 1967 suspended important parts of the previous 
constitution. It proscribed political parties which hastened 
the collapse of the first republic, and transferred some of 
the important powers vested in the regional governments to 
the federal Government.-^ The present Constitution favors a 
multi-party political system and lays down strict rules to 
govern the organization of the parties and ensure their 
national character. It also stipulates that no parties with 
religious, regional or ethnic bases will be tolerated. 
It is worthwhile to note that the post civil war admin¬ 
istrations represented a political leadership which were 
willing, able and courageous to take necessary decisions in 
^'Olajide Aluko, "Federal-State Relationship," in the 
Quarterly Journal of Administration (July , 1969). 
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foreign affairs. Thus observers view the post civil war 
foreign policy (particularly that of Muhammed/Obasanjo 
administration), as active in the sense that "it is in¬ 
dependent of major constraints...(and in that it assumes 
o o 
the momentum of initiative.... 
Having discussed the elements of Nigerian power and the 
dynamics of those elements from i960 through 1979» it may be 
appropriate to examine the attempt by the various regimes to 
mobilize them to achieve foreign policy objectives. In order 
to achieve its African objectives, Nigeria would have to 
influence the Western countries, particularly Britain and 
the United States, and their outpost, South Africa. 
Some useful deductions can be made from the discussion 
on Nigeria's capabilities. First, in regard to its economy 
during Abubakar's regime, it seems clear that although great 
quantities of agricultural and mineral products were present, 
they could not successfully be mobilized in order to carry out 
the country's foreign policy objectives. Some critics might 
argue that Nigeria could get those target countries to succumb 
to economic blackmail. But according to David Singer, "inter¬ 
nation influence is far from a one way affair....While 'A' 
is planning or attempting to influence 'B,' 'B' is itself 
exercising some impact on 'A's' behavior."77 For instance, on 
^Federal Nigeria 1:1 (1976), p. 6. 
39 
J. David Singer, "Inter-Pfetion Influence: A Formal 
Model," in James Fosenau, International Politics and Foreign 
39 
independence, Nigeria was desperately short of capital and 
If, o 
technical know-how to develop its natural resources just 
as the Western nations needed Nigeria's natural resources 
for industrial purposes. But again, the success or failure 
of acts of influence depends on the extent of needs between 
two sides in any influence continuum. 
During Sir Ababakar's regime, Nigeria's economy was 
structurally tied to the West through which Nigerians could 
obtain aid and investmentsIt is a fact that its size 
offered an enviable market for the West for the disposal of 
their manufactured goods and procurement of raw materials, 
yet any attempt to utilize this factor for influence pur¬ 
poses could become a disutility since the West has alternative 
42 
markets in other parts of Africa. Moreover Nigeria feared 
the boomerang of economic blackmail since that could precip¬ 
itate retaliations in the form of discontinuation of foreign 
Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free 
Press, 1969) » P* 3^2• 
40 
Claude Phillips, op. cit., p. 55* 
41 
For instance The First Nigerian Development Plan en¬ 
tailed a total expenditure of 1.9 billion dollars of which 
949 million dollars were supposed to come from the West. 
Federal Nigeria 1:1 (1976), p. 5* 
42 
The West could buy cocoa and palm produce from Ghana 
and Sierra Leone; Rubber from Liberia; Groundnuts from Gambia 
and Senegal; Minerals like gold, diamond coal, tin etc. from 
South Africa and Zaire; and oil from various areas of the 
world. (Refer to K.B.C. Onwubiko, History of West Africa 
1800-Present Day; Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. 
40 
aid and investments which it so badly needed. This therefore 
raises the question why Nigeria chose to organize its 
economic relations in such as way as to limit its freedom of 
action in foreign policy, when alternative arrangements of 
43 economic relations could be pursued. 
However, with the country's oil boom in the 1970s, and 
as a result of the insatiable demand for this commodity 
throughout the industrial world, Nigeria's economic capa¬ 
bility became very potent. Hans Morgenthau recognized the 
impact of oil upon national power when he said, "The emergence 
of oil as an indispensable raw material has brought about a 
44 shift in the relative power...of nations. He added, "The 
Soviet Union has become more powerful since it is self 
sufficient in this respect, while Japan has grown considerably 
43 
weaker, since it is completely lacking m oil deposits." 
One might argue that the disparity in the relative power of 
these nations could not be based mainly on the possession or 
46 non posssession of oil. However in the case of Nigeria in 
Multinational Corporations (Westpoint, Connecticut: Lawrence 
Hill, and Co., 1976-). 
43 The Abubakar regime refused to expand economic re¬ 
lations with the Eastern Europe in order not to antagonize 
the West. 
44 Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 426. 
^Ibid. 
46 Other elements of national power including Geography, 
the 1970s, oil afforded it a great capability for a more 
dynamic African policy. Hence it was able to reduce its 
reliance on foreign aid. This was reflected on the 1970/7^ 
Development plan which anticipated only about 20 percent of 
4-7 
total investment from foreign sources. 
It became very significant that Nigeria could effec¬ 
tively utilize its oil as a weapon in matters pertaining to 
colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. This is be¬ 
cause need, like capability, determines the effectiveness of 
acts of influence or the quality of responsiveness. Since 
the industrial countries have not yet developed enough 
alternative sources of energy, they could not help but coax 
and appease the oil producing countries. Thus when Nigeria 
threatened to apply drastic action against British interests 
in Nigeria if Britain decided to resume arms sales to South 
Africa or if she compromised with Ian Smith of Rhodesia 
h o 
(Zimbabwe) in his bid to suppress majority rule in Zimbabwe, 
she (Britain) had no other choice but to acquiesce to Nigerian 
demands. 
In 1979» Nigeria flexed its economic muscles by nation¬ 
alizing British Petroleum's assets due to its alleged export 
quality and quantity of armed forces, population, national 
character, and quality of diplomacy, play a very useful role 
too. 
L 7 




of Nigerian oil to South Africa and also as a result of the 
sour nature of Anglo-Nigerian relations caused hy Mrs. 
Thatcher's initial insensitivity to the question of majority 
LL Q 
rule in Zimbabwe. 
7
 Nigeria's oil weapon also deterred the 
United States from lifting its sanctions on Zimbabwe before 
~ 0 
the attainment of majority rule."' 
Furthermore, Nigeria's economic capability enhanced its 
military preparedness and its ability to utilize the military 
to pursue some of its African policy objectives."*^ During 
the first republic, officers and men of the Nigerian military 
did not constitute an adequate force for a country that looked 
forward to the leadership of Africa. In addition, Nigeria 
did not indulge in any diversification of sources of military 
assistance but rather depended almost entirely on Britain. 
This contributed immensely to Abubakar's refusal to train 
freedom fighters or accept the concept of armed liberation 
struggle in Southern Africa since this could be interpreted 
as hostility against its West European allies. 
On the other hand, Abubakar's Government provided the 
United Nations force in the Congo in i960 with a battalion of 
the Nigerian Army and also in 1964, replaced the Royal Marine 
^West Africa (August 6, 1979)» p. 1394. 
"*^0ver 30 percent of the U.S. imports of crude oil 
comes from Nigeria. See Nigeria in the U.N. (1976), p. 35. 
c 1 
Refer to page 21 of this study. 
"^William Gutteridge, op. cit., pp. 126-127. 
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Commando, a branch of the British military establishment, in 
helping the Tanzanian Government to contain an Army mutiny 
there. v Actions of this nature were carried out only on the 
implicit approval of the West. 
However, with the civil war experience, and as a result 
of oil wealth, Nigeria was able to raise a large army, diver¬ 
sify its sources of military assistance, and accumulate large 
quantities of military hardware. Thus the post civil war 
regimes could afford to spearhead a campaign in Africa to 
establish an African High Command which could become a base 
for the struggle against white domination particularly in 
Southern Africa. It demonstrated its influence in Africa by 
voluntarily sending troops to the Republic of Guinea to help 
that government to repulse the Portuguese sponsored "Bay-of- 
54 
Pigs style invasion of that country. It also sent troops 
to the Chad Republic to help settle that country’s internal 
crisis. In addition it supported the liberation movements 
in Southern Africa and established an office in Lagos to 
coordinate certain aspects of the liberation activities. 
As a result of Nigeria's growing confidence, the idea 
of deploying Nigerian troops in Southern Africa started to 
53Ibid. 
54 J R.A. Akindele, "The Conduct of Nigeria's Foreign 
Relations." International Problems 11 (October, 1973). 
55 
See West Africa (March 26, 1979), p. 523. 
^Africa Contemporary Record, 1972, p. B658. 
44 
^7 receive credibility among the Nigerian elite. ' For instance 
one of the government leaders, Alhaji Aminu Kano suggested 
that Nigeria should become "the base for the struggle against 
Q 
white domination.The implication of this statement is 
that the post civil war military establishment had reached a 
considerable degree of military preparedness capable of 
supporting Nigeria's African policies. This may be an over- 
e Q 
statement due to Western collaboration^7 with racist regimes 
in Southern Africa to perpetuate racialism and imperialism. 
Western interests in Southern Africa make it imperative that 
any attempt to liquidate white domination particularly in 
South Africa and Namibia would be viewed by the Western World 
with the greatest concern. 
Nevertheless, it is very significant to note that in 
quantitative and qualitative terms, a great disperity existed 
between the mini armed forces of the Abubakar regime and the 
-^Olajide Aluko, "Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy," 
Political Quarterly 40 (April-June, 1971)» p. 188. 
58Ibid. 
77For generations, Western nations including the United 
Kingdom, U.S., West Germany and France have been intimately 
involved with the racist politics of Southern Africa in general 
and South Africa in particular. In the economic sphere for 
instance, the drive for exploitation and domination of millions 
of Africans derive from these countries who function in 
collaboration with the racist regimes. The U.K. is the most 
important source of foreign investment in South Africa, with 
over 1000 firms operating in the country. The U.S. ranks 
second with over 300 firms; West Germany ranks third, France, 
fourth. Other countries include Switzerland, Israel and Japan. 
(See Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational 
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more sophisticated forces of the post civil war regimes. The 
post civil war regimes were military regimes and their troops 
had had combat experience while fighting a gruesome war 
against Biafra. Secondly they possessed much greater quantity 
of men and arms which, to a large measure, would enhance 
military capability. Therefore in view of this enormous change 
in her military preparedness, Nigeria's African policy during 
the 19?0s became more dynamic. 
Above all, unlike the Abubakar regime, the military 
regimes represented an embodiment of political leadership 
which was willing, able and courageous to mobilize Nigeria's 
capabilities to achieve their African objectives. Under the 
military regimes, Nigeria abandoned the lukewarm approach to 
African problems and pursued its African policy even when it 
was in direct conflict with the West. 
Corporations; United Nations, Centre Against Apartheid 
(United Nations: Department of Political and Security 
Council Affairs, May 1978), "Activities of Transnational 
Corporations in South Africa," prepared by Ann Seidman and 
Neva Makgetta. 
CHAPTER III 
NIGERIA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
There is no part of Southern Africa which had not been 
in recent years, the subject of violent discontent, debate, 
protest and conflict in general world opinion, the United 
Nations and various other international bodies. The major 
issue is the political, economic and social relations that 
exist between Whites and Blacks who constitute the majority 
in that region. 
Although all of colonial Africa was characterized by 
extreme socio-economic inequality between the indigenous 
population and the colonizers, the problems were more acute 
in the settler colonies of Southern Africa. The white 
minorities who depict themselves as the bastion of culture 
and progress employ racial discrimination and exploitation, 
often with overt and covert support from the Western world to 
perpetuate their interests. In South Africa and Namibia, the 
white settlers monopolize power, while Angola and Mozambique 
were under the authoritarian metropolitan control of Portugal. 
Zimbabwe until March of this year, was under a racist minority 
regime. 
Apart from the preservation of its sovereignty and in- 
46 
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dependence, which constitute the core objective of every 
nation, the various Nigerian administrations (I96O-I979), 
sought to eliminate these forms of domination in all parts of 
Africa. They argued that the country's independence would be 
at stake unless colonialism and all other forms of indignities 
meted to the Africa was eliminated.'*" Therefore, the major 
concern of the next two chapters is to examine the country's 
relations with Southern Africa during the pre and post civil 
war era. 
In order to effect a change in Southern Africa, the 
various Nigerian regimes attempted to mobilize their capa¬ 
bilities to influence not only South Africa but also its 
Western allies. But as indicated in the last chapter, capa¬ 
bilities mean very little unless they are effectively and 
skillfully mobilized in order to achieve an objective. In 
the same vein, effective mobilization depends on careful 
utilization of instruments of foreign policy which may in¬ 
clude diplomatic bargaining, propaganda, clandestine actions, 
threats or military intervention. The extent to which the 
pre and post civil war regimes applied these techniques for 
influence purposes are discussed in the next two chapters. 
Elaborate attention is given to Nigeria's use of the concept 
of multilateral conference diplomacy which is institutionalized 
in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and also 
1 Federal Nigeria 1:1 (1976), p. 3. 
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2 
the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). 
Section I 
The First Civilian Regime 1960-1966 
Shortly before Nigeria became independent, two burning 
issues, all dealing with Africa, pervaded the international 
environment. One of these was the issue of French atomic 
3 
tests in the Sahara, in spite of Nigeria's vehement objections, 
while the other was the South African Government actions at 
Sharpville in which 69 Africans peacefully demonstrating against 
4 
the apartheid policy of the South African Government were 
mowed down in "a hail of bullets" in cold blood by South 
African Police. 
On March 21, i960, seven months before Nigeria's in¬ 
dependence, large numbers of unarmed Africans in several black 
suburbs near white cities, marched without their passes up to 
the South African police to peacefully demonstrate their 
opposition against the "pass" system. At a police station in 
Sharpville, an industrial area near Johannesburg, a crowd 
estimated to be as large as 20,000 persons gathered and de¬ 
manded to be arrested. The police had expected such a de- 
2 
The utilization of these agencies as a diplomatic 
technique is treated seperately and extensively since the 
various governments regarded those organizations as indis¬ 
pensable instruments for the achievement of Nigeria's external 
policies (Federal Ministry of Information, News Release No. 
1538, December 1, 1976. 
^See Claude Phillips, op. cit., pp. 124-126. 
^Current History 40 (February, 1961), p. 109- 
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monstration and had armed itself to the teeth to deal with 
the situation. Initially they refused to make arrests and 
ordered the demonstrators to disperse. When they refused to 
cooperate, the police closed in with armoured cars with which 
they surrounded the area and fired into the masses of de¬ 
monstrating Africans, killing about 69 of them and wounding 
approximately 200.^ 
Reactions to the Sharpville massacre were very sharp and 
swift. Spokesmen for African and Asian countries were more 
loudly critical of the South African Government but official 
as well as unofficial comment was world-wide. World opinion 
had tried to pressure South Africa into easing its racial 
policies. The racist government had been condemned in the 
United Nations. Even the business community within South 
Africa had earlier urged the government, though without success, 
to ease restrictions on the African laborer in order to create 
more stable economic conditions. The Sharpville incident 
intensified world opposition and heightened the antagonism 
which all Africans feel toward the apartheid system. In 
Nigeria, no other African problem precipitated such widespread 
public indignation and unity of feeling except the French 
atomic experiments in the Sahara. The political parties, the 
news media, and various organizations were in complete agree¬ 
ment in their condemnation of South Africa and in their demand 
that after independence, Nigeria should insist on the with- 
5Ibid. 
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drawal of the South African government from the British 
g 
Commonwealth of Nations. 
On April 5» I960, a bill was passed into law in the 
Nigerian Parliament which urged the Balewa administration 
"to take appropriate steps to ban the importation of South 
African goods in this country."' During the same month, a 
motion introduced in the Northern Nigerian House of Assembly, 
by a private member, Mr. G.U. Ohikere, calling on the 
Northern Government "to urge the Federal Government to take 
the severest actions within its powers so as to bring an end 
to the present racial segregation and inhuman treatment of 
g 
our fellow Africans in South Africa," was unanimously ac¬ 
cepted. Also, in expressing his indignation at the Sharpville 
Massacre, the Premier of Northern Nigeria had earlier an¬ 
nounced the termination of the services of white South Africans 
in Northern Nigeria as a reflection of his opposition to 
Q 
South Africa's policy of apartheid. 
With the widespread antagonism toward South Africa, it 
could easily be surmised that all politically interested 
Nigerians had a clear idea of the role the country was supposed 
g 
°The (British) Commonwealth of Nations is an Association 
of self governing autonomous, more or less loosely associated 
countries in a common alliance (as to the British Crown). 
7 
'House of Representatives (H.R.) Debates, March-May 
Session, i960, p. 152. 
g 
Nigeria Citizen (April 16, i960). 
9Ibid. 
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to play in the fight against colonialism. One member of 
Parliament vividly portrayed the role when he said, "God 
made us all equal and Nigeria by her size and position on the 
continent of Africa should not and must not move unconcerned 
while our brothers are being maltreated."'*'^ 
Vocal condemnations of South Africa also came from the 
Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar. Even before the killings in 
Sharpville, the Prime Minister had expressed his displeasure 
at South Africa's membership in the British Commonwealth 
because of its racist policies.'*'"*' In a similar move, Dr. 
Azikiwe made it clear during his inaugural address as Governor 
General that Nigeria would view an attempt by any country such 
as South Africa to indulge in racial prejudice as "a mark of 
12 
disrespect and an unfriendly act." 
In practical terms, the Balewa Administration was able 
to identify with the general view of most enlightened Nigerians 
that no matter how racial discrimination might be camouflaged 
by the South African regime, it would not remain unchallenged. 
Therefore it did not come as a surprise that in the Common¬ 
wealth Prime Minister's Conference held in March 1961, Sir 
Abubakar, became instrumental to South Africa's explusion from 
the Commonwealth. ^ He refused to identify himself with the 
10H.R. Debates (April 5, i960), Col 667. 
■*~"*"H.R. Debates (January, i960), p. 90. 
12 
Federal Nigeria (November-December, i960), p. 1. 
~*~^West Africa Pilot (March 20, 1961 ). 
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pro South African position taken by the British Prime Minister, 
14 Harold Macmillan and Robert Menzies of Australia. Although 
the Prime Minister's statement on the South African issue 
more or less showed more concern for the Commonwealth, it was 
assumed that South Africa's expulsion was mainly due to the 
Prime Minister's stance. He declared: 
We Nigerians attached great importance to the Common¬ 
wealth which embraces people of all races, colour and 
creed. This being so, it is incumbent upon every mem¬ 
ber nation to respect fundamental human rights or 
equality of individuals irrespective of race or colour 
or skin. The best course, therefore, for any member 
who feels she cannot accept this basic principle is to 
quit the club. South Africa's exit from the Common¬ 
wealth will save this great family of nations embarras- 
ment. I consider it is a blessing in disguise. Rather 
than disintegrate the Commonwealth without South Africa 
will continue to grow from strength to strength.15 
Sir Abubakar's role at the conference was widely 
applauded by the Nigerian press who thought he demonstrated, 
"a masterpiece of statemanship." South Africa's explusion 
might not have solved the problem of apartheid as the Prime 
17 Minister later admitted. 1 However the Nigerians felt that 
it was the beginning of attacks that could eventually lead to 
the collapse of the apartheid government. 
As a follow-up of Nigeria's opposition to South African 
policy, the Nigerian Minister of Labor, Mr. J.M. Johnson, at 
1A 
J.D.B. Miller, "South Africa's Departure," Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies 1 (I96I-63), p. 56. 
~*~^West Africa (March 18, 1961), p. 305. 
Daily Express (March 19, 1961), p. 1. 
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the Geneva meeting of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), held in June I96I submitted a resolution that South 
Africa be asked to quit the Organization on the grounds that 
its apartheid policy in labor matters was a violation of the 
principles of the Organization. The resolution specifically 
called on the I.L.O. Conference to (1) Condemn the racial 
policies of the government of South Africa. (2) Declare that 
the continued membership of the government of South Africa in 
the I.L.O. was not in the best interests of the Organization, 
and (3) Resolve that the governing body of the I.L.O. shall 
call upon the government of South Africa to withdraw from 
membership of the organization. The motion carried by 163 
18 
votes to 0, with 89 abstentions. 
In another development in November 1961, the Nigerian 
Foreign Minister Mr. Jaja Wachukwu was found at the fore¬ 
front of the United Nations censure of South Africa. The 
Foreign Minister drafted a resolution, endorsed by twenty- 
five states, which successfully imposed the United Nations 
censure upon that Republic. Addressing the Special Political 
Committee of the General Assembly in this regard, Mr. Wachukwu 
remarked, "The independence of certain African states would be 
meaningless if in other parts of Africa black men did not have 
freedom. The independence movement in Africa as a whole would 
be a failure if black men anywhere in the world continued to 
18 
Daily Express (July 1, 1961). The abstainers were 
delegates from United States, Western Europe, Australia and 
Canada. See Claude Phillips, op. cit., p. 120. 
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be oppressed and to be judged not by their capabilities but 
19 
by the colour of their skins." Upon his return to Nigeria, 
he declared in Parliament, 
It was at our suggestion at the United Nations that 
the Security Council was asked to consider applying 
the provisions of article 6 of the United Nations 
Charter, which says that when a member continues to 
disobey or infringe the charter of the organization, 
then the possibility of such member's explusion must 
be considered under article 6 of the charter. We, 
in conjunction with other African states, brought 
this resolution to the Political Committee and it was 
passed. Now we want the Security Council to consider 
the possibility of expelling South Africa from the 
United Nations under article 6.20 
In that same month, Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs 
Alhaji Usman Sarki, decided to expel the South African Dutch 
Reformed Church from Nigeria because of its identification 
21 with apartheid. 
Still in the November Session of the House of Parliament, 
the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Dr. T.O. Elias 
tabled a motion, asking for the withdrawal of Commonwealth 
22 
privileges from South African nationals in Nigeria. The 
motion, which carried unanimously, made it imperative that 
henceforth, all South African nationals in Nigeria would be 
treated as foreigners. What all these actions indicate is that 
"^A/SPC/L.71 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1-4, L.72/Rev.1. 
20H.R. Debates (November, I96I), p. 14. 
21 xIbid. 
22 
H.R. Debates (November, I96I Session), p. 14 Gordon 
Idang, Nigeria: International Politics and Foreign Policy, 
55 
the Balewa Administration dogged South Africa's footsteps as 
long as it refused to abandon its policies. Not only did the 
administration stand opposed to South Africa's racial policies, 
it also opposed her policy toward Namibia. Therefore, not 
suprisingly, Nigeria joined other independent African countries 
in encouraging Ethiopia and Liberia in I960 to bring the case 
23 of Namibia before the International Court of Justice. 
Portuguese failure to decolonize Mozambique, Angola and 
Guinea Bissau met also with charged emotions and an immense de¬ 
gree of criticism throughout Nigeria. From the beginning of the 
rebellion by African nationalists, caused by the repressive 
measure adopted against the colonized peoples of these coun¬ 
tries, there was unanimous condemnation of Portuguese actions 
in the Nigerian press. Security Council debates on the issue 
of decolonization were religiously reported ,and there were 
several editorial comments on the failure of Great Britain to 
vote for the Afro-Asian motion in the U.N. calling on Protugal 
to end "repressive measures" while on the other hand, the 
oh 
United States was praised for its favorable vote. More 
objections arose when a British frigate paid a courtesy call 
I96O-I966 Ibadan University Press*. September, 1973). Phillips, 
op. cit. , p. 121. 
23 ̂Ituen Bassey, "Nigeria's Foreign Relations: A Study of 
the Factors Influencing Nigeria's Foreign Relations After In¬ 
dependence," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Graduate School of 
St. Louis University, Missouri, 1970, p. 272. 
24- 
L. Gray Cowan, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Robert 
Tilman and Taylor Cole (eds.), The N gerian Political Scene 
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to Angola during that time and also on the basis of a rumour 
that Kano airport was being used as a staging post to fly in 
2 5 
Portuguese reinforcements to the Protuguese territories. 
In November I96I, Nigeria co-sponsored a resolution in 
the United Nations Assembly which rebuffed "the policy and 
practice of racial discrimination and segregation in non¬ 
self governing territories. It also joined Ghana that year 
to warn Portugal of the independent African states' deter¬ 
mination to eliminate all forms of colonialism and imperial- 
2 6 ism on the African continent. The Prime Minister took 
practical steps in this regard by officially according re¬ 
cognition to the Angola Government-in-exile led by Holden 
Roberto. 
Earlier, Abubakar's regime had aided refugees and had 
given bi-lateral assistance in the form of cash grants, 
scholarships for secondary, technical or University education 
and training facilities for vocational and technical training 
to bona fide national liberation movements in the territories 
2 8 still under colonial rule. 
To further demonstrate its determination to challenge 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 136. 
2 3 John Mackintosh, et. al., Nigerian Government and 
Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1966), p. 2?4. 
2 ô 
Gordon Idang, op. cit., p. 217. 
2^H.R. Debates, April 4, 1961, Col. 1682. 
2 8 
Gordon Idang, op. cit., p. 127. 
57 
Southern African racist regimes, Nigeria participated in the 
deliberations of a committee on sanction against South Africa, 
held in London in April, 1963. Nigeria not only endorsed the 
resolutions reached by the conference but also adopted 
effective measures to uphold the recommendations of trade 
boycotts and campaigns to force South Africa and Portugal out 
of the subsidiary organs and specialized agencies of the United 
29 
Nations. 7
The situation in Zimbabwe, to some extent, received the 
sustained attention of the Balewa Administration because of 
its (Rhodesia's) position as the Northern bastion of the white 
dominated subcontinent of Africa. Its constitution of December 
6, 1951, which had eliminated most of the residual powers 
formerly held by Britain, while holding only the most tenuous 
of promises for any meaningful black participation in govern¬ 
ment remained the constituent document of the territory until 
its unilateral declaration of Idependence in 1965* Not even 
the U.N. since 1962 had been able to get Britain to take 
immediate steps to set aside the 1961 constitution, in order 
to restore civil liberties or repeal all Rhodesian laws which 
sanctioned racial discrimination. 
Blacks, both without and within the Rhodesian colony had 
demanded from Britain a transition from the racialist minority 
government to majority rule and only after that, independence 




stitutionally transferred, not taking steps to effect a gradual 
constitutional advance toward democracy or majority rule, Mr. 
Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence in November 1965» 
Earlier, the Nigerian foreign Minister had assured the 
Nigerian Parliament that Nigeria "will not be favorably dis¬ 
posed towards any attempt to transfer power to a minority 
population in Zimbabwe particularly when it comes to matters 
SO of independence. Sir Abubakar himself was reported to have 
angrily warned: "anybody who rebels should be dealt with 
savagely. A rebellion is a rebellion and you cannot put it 
down by sanctions alone... other measures must be applied as 
31 well."^ These strongly worded statements raised the 
speculation that Nigeria might opt for the use of force to 
crush Ian Smith's rebellion. However it never followed through 
its threats because of its justification that punitive measures 
against Britain in retaliation for her acquiesence to 
Zimbabwe's U.D.I. would have far reaching negative implications 
for Nigeria. Instead, the Prime Minister proposed a Common¬ 
wealth Conference on the Zimbabwian situation in Lagos in 
January 1966, only a few days before the January 15 military 
coup in which he was killed. It was the first time the 
Commonwealth of Nations ever held a conference outside London. 
The only achievement of the Conference was the creation of the 
Sanctions Committee that would work out details of sanctions 
3°H.R. Debates, April 6, 1964, Col 1632. 
^West Africa (December 11, 1965). 
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against Zimbabwe. However that Committee never proved 
effective.^ 
Section II 
International Agencies and Nigeria's Policy 
Towards Southern Africa: The U.N. and the 
O.A.U. 1960-1966 
An analysis of Nigeria's performance in international 
organizations provides additional insight into the nation’s 
policy toward Southern Africa. Although organizations like 
the U.N. and the O.A.U. cannot serve as sole generators of 
pressures for issues such as anti-apartheidism or decoloni¬ 
zation in Southern Africa, they provide a forum where Nigeria 
can explain her position on such issues. 
The United Nations 
Nigeria's activities in the U.N. including the in¬ 
troduction of draft resolutions and its voting records are 
indications of its efforts to use its capabilities to weaken 
the position of the racist regimes of Southern Africa. 
In this section, roll-call votes on Southern African 
issues taken during the fifteenth to the twentieth plenary 
sessions (I96O-I966) of the General Assembly have been con¬ 
sidered. However in some instances where roll-call votes were 
in committee or where committee vote reflected an issue not 
discussed in the plenary session, the committed vote was con- 
32 James Barbar, "The Impact of the Rhodesian Crisis 
On the Commonwealth," Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies 7:2 (1969), p. 89. 
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sidered. 
During its first decade the U.N. was dominated by the 
Western powers and hence the problem which came before it 
were structured and defined in terms of Western interest. 
However the increase of membership in the 1960's by Afro 
Asian nations (including Nigeria), who were generally ex¬ 
colonial and non-white brought with it a new focus geared 
towards speedy extermination of the remaining bastions of 
European colonialism and racialism in Southern Africa. 
The fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations held in i960, marked an epoch in the history 
of the Organization. During this session alone, seventeen 
new members joined the U.N., sixteen of which were from Africa, 
whereas in the first ten years of its birth, only ten new 
nations joined. The impact of their entry reflected the in¬ 
creased amount of time devoted to the discussion of colonial 
issues, most of which centered on South Africa, S. West Africa 
(Namibia), Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In i960, the 
colonial issues that featured most prominently in the U.N. 
were the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting 
from the policies of apartheid of the Government of South 
Africa and the question of Namibia. 
South Africa 
The question of South Africa's racial policies were con¬ 
sidered by the U.N. Security Council between March 30 and 
April 1, i960 at the request of Afro Asian countries including 
Nigeria, in the aftermath of the violent incident at Sharpville. 
61 
The Security Council adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 
abstentions, a resolution emphasizing that the South African 
situation, "if continued might endanger international secu¬ 
rity." It deplored the Sharpville incident and called upon 
South Africa "to initiate measures aimed at bringing about 
racial harmony based on equality." The resolution also re¬ 
quested the U.N. Secretary General "in consultation with the 
Union of South Africa, to make such arrangements as would 
adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of 
the character and report to the Security Council whenever 
3 3 
necessary and appropriate." 
Nigeria was one of the ninety three countries to vote 
in favor of a draft resolution introduced on April 13, 1961, 
by India, Ceylon, Malaya and the United Arab Republic which 
"deprecated policies based on racial discrimination as re¬ 
prehensible and repugnant to human dignity; affirmed that the 
racial policies pursued by the Union of South Africa were a 
flagrant violation of the charter of the U.N. and Declaration 
of Human Rights and inconsistent with the obligations of 
member states." The draft resolution called on the Government 
of South Africa "to bring its policies and conduct into con- 
3/1 
formity with its obligations under the charter.""^ 
3 3 
U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report on the United 
Nations, i960 (Dept, of State Publication 73^1. March, 1962), 
PP. 75-76. 
3 LL 
U.N. Resolution, 1958 (XV), 981st Plenary Meeting, 
April 13, I96I. 
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Further evidence of the Nigerian intentions towards 
South Africa came in the Fall of 1961, when as indicated 
earlier, the Nigerian Foreign Minister. Mr. Jaja Wachukwu 
introduced a resolution signed by twenty five African states 
which successfully brought the United Nation's censure on 
South Africa. 
Another move against South Africa was made on August 14, 
1962. Forty eight Afro Asian countries including Nigeria re¬ 
quested that the following items be included on the agenda of 
the General Assembly. (1) Race Conflict in South Africa, and 
(2) Treatment of the people of India and Indo-Pakistan origin 
in the Republic of South Africa. On September 19, 1962, the 
General Assembly agreed to include these items on its agenda 
over the objection of the South African Government which 
claimed that deliberation on such matters contravened the 
terms of article 2 (7) of the United Nations charter on domestic 
jurisdiction. ■J Although the inclusion of such items never 
yielded a change of attitude from South Africa, it was a re¬ 
minder to that Government that as long as it clung to its 
policies of apartheid, it was treading on dangerous ground. 
During most of 1963, South Africa's racist policies 
were under consideration in both the plenary General Assembly 
and in the Security Council. Nigeria was one of thirty two 
African states who, in a letter dated July 11, 1963, asked 
35 
U.N. General Assembly Official Records, Plenary 
Meetings, 17th Session 2 (1962). 
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the Security Council "to consider the explosive situation 
existing in South Africa, which constitutes a serious threat 
to international peace and security." The letter was the 
product of a Summit Conference of Independent African states 
held in Addis Ababa in May, 1963. 
Earlier, in a letter to the President of the Security 
Council dated May 6, 1963, the Special Committee on Apartheid 
(Nigeria was a member),indicated that the committee "con¬ 
siders it highly desirable" that the Council should recognize 
the "grave situation in South Africa as a result of its policies. 
Therefore in August 1963» the Security Council adopted a re¬ 
solution, "calling on South Africa to liberate political 
prisoners who were held under arbitrary laws. In the plenary 
session, Nigeria was one of the 106 members who voted to con¬ 
demn South Africa for its failure to heed past U.N. resolutions; 
requested South Africa to abandon the arbitrary trial and 
"grant unconditional release" to all prisoners; requested 
member states to induce South Africa to comply immediately and 
asked the Secretary General to report as soon as possible on 
implementation. (A/Res. 1881 (XVIII) 
Again in March 1964, the Apartheid Committee which in¬ 
cluded Nigeria submitted to the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, several reports on the developments in South 
o £ 
OihGP ïïiGïïibGPS of thG Ap3.pfh.Gid Conuni'fc'tGGi. wGPG AlgGPÎ3, 
Costa.Rica, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Malaya, Nepal, 
Phillipines and Somalia. 
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Africa. One of the reports issued on March 23, dealt with 
the "repressive measures against the opponents of apartheid 
in the Republic of South Africa. Its annual reports issued in 
November, called for a wide range of economic sanctions against 
South Africa including individual embargoes on rubber, 
chemicals, gold, diamond and Iron ore. 
South West Africa (Namibia) 
Sir Abubakar's regime as already indicated voiced out 
its opposition to South Africa's colonial policies in Namibia. 
Like his South African policy, the Prime Minister equally 
utilized the United Nations as a forum to demonstrate its 
opposition to South Africa's presence in Namibia. 
In November i960, Nigeria, in concert with Ghana and 
Sudan, introduced a draft resolution in the General Assembly 
expressing its concern that the administration of Namibia had 
been maintained "in a manner contrary to the mandate, the 
charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Resolution of the General Assembly, in¬ 
cluding resolution 449 A (V) of December 1950, by which the 
General Assembly accepted the advisory opinion of July 11, 
1950 of the International Court of Justice concerning South 
Africa." Unwillingness to comply with the 1950 decision of 
the International Court of Justice (U.N. Official Records A/C 
4/L. 652), Ethiopia and Liberia, on November 4 had filed 
Concurrent Applications in the International Court of Justice 
instituting "contentious proceedings against the Union of 
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37 
South Africa."^' Through the efforts of these countries in¬ 
cluding Nigeria, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted 
by a vote of 86 to 0, with 6 abstentions, a resolution noting 
and commending the legal action taken by the Governments of 
Ethiopia and Liberia. 
Other resolutions adopted by the world body criticized 
the application by South Africa in Namibia, of the policy 
of apartheid, and also expressed deep regret over the wanton 
massacre of a number of indigenous inhabitants of Namibia and 
their forcible removal from Windhoek-their capital. The U.N. 
also urged the South African Government to cease the arbitrary 
imprisonment and deportation of political leaders of the 
o O 
Territory. 
In the spring of 1961, Nigeria voted to endorse two re¬ 
solutions on Namibia adopted at the resumed 15th General 
Assembly. One of these resolutions 1593 (XV), appealed to all 
members of the U.N. who have "close and continuous" relations 
with the South African Government to exert their influence on 
that Government in order that it would conduct itself in a 
manner condusive to its charter obligations and equally adjust 
its policies to the General Assembly's resolutions. The other 
resolution, 159 (XV), noted with regret that South Africa had 
refused to cooperate with the Committee on Namibia and re- 
37 
U.N. Monthly Chronicle 1:1 (May, 1964), p. 43. 
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General Assembly Official Records, A/C.4/L. 654; A/C. 
4/L. 653. 
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quested the committee to proceed with its investigation with 
or without such cooperation. Apparently, the investigations 
were completed in Cairo and Dar-es-Salaam without any co¬ 
operation from the South African Government-which refused 
to admit the Committee to Namibia. On submission of its 
reports to the General Assembly, South Africa's actions were 
condemned as a danger to international peace and security. 
In the General Assembly meeting held on September 20, 
1963, several representatives including those from Nigeria 
condemned the continuing support of South Africa by certain 
powers or certain financial groups which they claimed, en¬ 
couraged South Africa to persist in its attitude. Nigeria 
was one of the countries in the same session of the General 
Assembly which adopted a resolution urging all states to re¬ 
frain from (a) Supplying arms or military equipment to South 
Africa (b) Supplying South Africa with petroleum or petroleum 
products, and (c) Any action to hamper implementation of U.N. 
resolutions A/Res. 1899 (XVIII). 
Most of the deliberations on Namibia in 1964 were done 
on Special Committees and Nigeria's role in those committees 
was minimal. In 1965» the United Nations more or less was 
occupied with the threat posed to international peace by 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. As usual, 
Nigeria used the U.N. as a platform to demonstrate its foreign 
policy stance toward that country. 
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Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
Zimbabwe has also received a sustained attention of the 
United Nations. From 1953 until 1963, this country, manipulat¬ 
ed by whites as in South Africa, was part of an uneasy 
federation with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland 
(Malawi). However, the British-created federation dis¬ 
integrated in 1963 partly due to Zimbabwian (then Southern 
Rhodesia) anachronistic racial policies. Subsequently Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) reassumed the status of a self governing, but a 
dependent British colony, with a constitution which denied 
civil liberties to Rhodesian Blacks. This situation con¬ 
tinuously attracted international outrage. 
On October 23, 1962, fifty one African and Asian U.N. 
members including Nigeria introduced a draft resolution in the 
Fourth Committee of the U.N. stating that any attempt by 
Zimbabwe to impose its racialist constitution will aggravate 
the existing explosive situation in that territory. The re¬ 
solution urged the United Kingdom to suspend the unpopular 
constitution and work toward the formulation of a new 
Zimbabwian constitution. The resolution was adopted by the 
Fourth Committee on October 31 by a vote of 81 to 2, with 17 
39 
abstentions. y
A roll-call vote was taken on a draft resolution sub¬ 
mitted by forty five Afro-Asian states including Nigeria on 
October 18, 1963. This resolution noted "the continued denial 
39 AC./4/L. 753, October 31, 1962. 
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to the vast majority of the African population of their basic 
political rights" in Zimbabwe. It was also mindful of the 
request of "the settler minority government" for independence. 
It therefore called on the United Kingdom not to yield to the 
request until majority rule was established. This resolution 
was approved in the Plenary Session by a vote of 78 in favor, 
2 against and 19 abstentions.^0 Nigeria voted in favor of 
this resolution. 
In the early part of 1965» there were some indications 
that the minority regime in Zimbabwe would, in actuality sieze 
independence from Britain unilaterally. In view of such a 
threat, forty five Afro Asian states submitted a resolution in 
the General Assembly condemning any attempt by the regime to 
carry out such an action. Nigeria was one of the sponsors of 
this resolution (General Resolution 2012 (XX), October 12, 1965. 
Almost simultaneously, thirty six African states includ¬ 
ing Nigeria drafted a resolution in the General Assembly call¬ 
ing on Britain "to employ all necessary measures, including 
military force" to prevent an illegal Declaration of In¬ 
dependence However on November 11, 1965 » the Minority re¬ 
gime obstinately declared Rhodesia independent. In reaction 
to this, the General Assembly almost unanimously voted to 
condemn the Zimbabwian action. The African resolution was thus 
4°A/Res. 1889 (XVIII), October 18, 1963. 
ALT 
G.A. Res. 2024 (XX), November 11, 1965. 
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passed by a vote of 107 in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstaining 
(General Assembly Resolution 2024 (XX), November 11, 1965* 
On the same day that the General Assembly adopted the 
African resolution, 57 African and Asian states requested the 
Security Council to consider the situation in Zimbabwe (Southern 
Rhodesia) brought about by the unilateral declaration of in¬ 
dependence of the Smith government. The Council President 
Mr. Ortiz-Sanz of Bolivia, convened the Security Council on 
the morning of November 12, 1965. In response to the requests 
of the Afro-Asian states, Representatives of Algeria, India, 
Pakistan, Ghana, Zambia, Sierra Lerone, Senegal, Mali, 
Tanzania, Guinea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Gambia, Jamaica, Somalia, 
Sudan and Nigeria were invited to participate without the right 
to vote. It was in this meeting that the Representative of 
Ghana, speaking on behalf of the African states accused 
Britain of its readiness to order its troops to shoot colo¬ 
nial subjects when their skin was black or brown but not when 
their skin was white. This accusation was in response to 
Britain's refusal to use force to crush Ian Smith's rebellion. 
The Security Council adopted a resolution, calling upon all 
states "to refrain from any action which would assist the re¬ 
gime, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment, and 
military material and to their utmost, to break all economic 
relations with Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) including the in- 
42 stitution of an embargo on oil and oil products." 
42 
Security Council Res. 216 (1965), November 12, 1965; 
and 217 (1965)» November 20, 1965. 
Angola and Mozambique 
The attrocities being committed by Portugal in Angola, 
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau came to the attention of the 
United Nations in 1961. This was as a result of numerous re¬ 
ports of wanton massacre of dozens of Africans demonstrating 
in Angola against Portuguese brutalities. The demonstrations 
attacked a Portuguese prison in Luanda, the capital of Angola 
to protest what was described as "frightful crimes committed 
under the cloak of civilization." Reports of arbitrary im¬ 
prisonment and torture of African leaders in those colonies 
were rampant. Therefore there were spontaneous revolts by the 
Africans from time to time. But these revolts were repulsed 
by the Portuguese troops in a most brutal manner. However 
the incident of February A, 1961 was saddled with disquieting 
atrocities perpetrated by the Portuguese armoured troops. 
Dozens of people were brutually murdered and hundreds, wounded. 
Again, on March 15, 1961, widespread disorders broke out in 
Northern Angola with the panic striken population, fleeing into 
the forests, as the Portuguese troops were burning villages 
and decimating the inhabitants. 
In view of the gravity of the situation, a Nigerian 
delegation, along with representatives of 45 Afro-Asian 
countries, inscribed in the General Assembly’s agenda, an item 
43 990th Plenary Session, Item 92, April 20, 1961. 
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entitled, "The situation in Angola." These countries 
spoke in the General Assembly condemning Portugal for its re¬ 
fusal to implement reforms in its colonies, looking toward 
self determination. In his address to the General Assembly, 
the Nigerian representative declared, 
If there was need to condemn any country in the 
strongest terms possible, this is the time to do 
so in respect of Portugal....We have also de¬ 
clared in no uncertain terms that the United 
Nations accept the principle of self deter¬ 
mination for all peoples, irrespective of race, 
colour or creed and that all are equally en¬ 
titled to strive for independence from foreign 
domination and to enjoy unlimited sovereignty 
within their territorial boundaries. The 
Portuguese doctrine of Assimilation is one 
that cannot be sustained, just as the doctrine 
of Angola's being a part of Portugal based as 
it is on a legal fiction, must collapse. For 
this is no more than semantic camouflage of 
the worst colonial system still, in existence 
today on the African continent. 
In a vote of 73 to 2, Portugal was urged by the U.N. General 
Assembly to cooperate with the U.N. and implement reform with 
a view to granting autonomy to its territories. (A./L. 345 
and Add. 1-5) 
In 1963, Nigeria, along with 65 other nations introduced 
a draft resolution which (a) recalled the Security Council re¬ 
solution of July 1963» asking for the end of repression in the 
Portuguese territories and immediate steps to independence. 
It also requested the Security Council to take up the question 
45 
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’General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, 109th Plenary 
Session, January 17, 1962. 
72 
and "adopt necessary measures to give effect to its own de¬ 
cisions." This was approved in Plenary Session by 91 votes 
in favor, 2 against and 11 abstentions. (A/Res. 1913 
(xviii), 1963. 
The Security Council on the request of the O.A.U. of 
which Nigeria is a member in turn discussed the question of 
the Portuguese territories on November 4, 1965 and approved 
a resolution that (a) reaffirmed the rights of all peoples 
to self determination (b) urged amnesty for all political 
prisoners in the Portuguese territories and (c) called on all 
states to refrain from equipping Portugal with arms that 
47 could be employed in representing dependent territories. ' 
Quantitatively, within the period between October 1, 
i960 (Nigeria's day of independence) and January 15, 1966 
(the end of the first Republic), 120 anti apartheid and 
colonial draft resolutions were introduced in the United 
Nations by member nations. Out of this number, Nigeria 
sponsored or co-sponsored a total of 41. Also out of a 
total number of 69 votes taken in the Plenary meetings, 
General Assembly and Special Political Committees, Nigeria 
voted 60 times to condemn Southern African colonialism and 
48 apartheidism. 
47 U.N. Monthly Chroncle 2:10 (November, 1965), pp. 35 
37- 
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Summary of resolution and votes is adopted from 
United Nations Year Book, 1960-66; U.N. General Assembly 
Official Records-Plenary Meeting; Special Political Committee 
Meeting (United Nations, New York, I96O-I966; U.N. Monthly 
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The O.A.U. 
One of the aims of the O.A.U. which incidentally coin¬ 
cided with part of Nigeria's African policy is the total 
eradication of racialism, colonialism and imperialism from 
Africa. Therefore the Balewa administration tried not to 
equivocate in utilizing the O.A.U. as a medium for its foreign 
policy formulations towards Southern Africa. 
On the "basis of an invitation from the Nigerian govern¬ 
ment, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers met on February 24, 
1964, in an Ordinary Session in Lagos (Nigeria), to discuss 
among other things, issues concerning Southern Africa. In a 
decision reached by the Council of Ministers during the six- 
day conference, member states were urged to deny the use of 
their ports and overflying rights and other facilities to 
ships and aircrafts proceeding to or returning from South 
Africa. The Conference also submitted a resolution to the 
next Heads of States Conference condemning the South African 
government whose policy, "constitutes a grave danger to the 
stability and peace of Africa and the world." (West African 
Pilot, March 2, 1964) 
On Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Council noted the 
"explosive situation" that was incumbent on the country's 
political atmosphere. It called on the British Government to 
prevent the threat of a unilateral independence or a "subtle 
Chronicle. 
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assumption of power by the minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia. The Council of Ministers urged Britain to convene 
a fully representative Constitutional Conference of all 
political parties in Zimbabwe to decide on immediate in- 
49 
dependence on the basis of "one man, one vote." Mr. 
Jonas M. Savimbi, the Foreign Minister of the Angola Pro¬ 
visional Government led by Mr. Holden Roberto was admitted 
for the first time to the O.A.U. Conference of Foreign 
Ministers.^ 
Nigerian Prime Minsiter attended the First Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which 
was held in Cairo from July 17 to 21. In this particular 
Conference, the delegates adopted with acclamation, re¬ 
solutions on Southern Africa including the Republic of South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and the Protuguese territories. 
On South Africa, the Heads of State including the Nigerian 
Prime Minister, reiterated the call made by the Council of 
Ministers for the cooperation of all countries and partic¬ 
ularly the major trading partners in the economic boycott of 
South Africa. They also appealed to all the oil producing 
countries to cease, as a matter of urgency, their supply of 
oil products to South Africa. Moreover the Heads of State 
called for the release of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, 
Mangalisso Sobukwe and all other Africans imprisoned by South 
^West African Pilot (March 2, 1964). 
-^Nigerian Morning Post (February 26, 1964). 
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Africa because of their opposition to that regime's 
apartheid policies. 
As regards Zimbabwe, the Assembly vowed "to take 
vigorous and immediate step" against any U.D.I. by the white 
minority regime. The Heads of State pledged to adopt ade¬ 
quate measures "including the recognition and support of an 
African Nationalist Government-in-Exile if there arose such 
an eventuality. They also repeated the call made by the 
Council of Ministers in Britain to take immediate measures 
to prepare a new constitution that ensured majority rule in 
Rhodesia. In conclusion, they asked for the immediate re¬ 
lease of Dr. Joshua Nkomo, Reverend Ndabinongo Sithole and 
all other political prisoners and detainees.^ 
The African leaders condemned Portugal for its "per¬ 
sistent refusal to recognize the rights of the people under 
its domination to self determination and independence and 
for its non-compliance with the resolutions of the United 
Nations Security and General Assembly." They decided to 
establish a bureau within the O.A.U. General Secretariat 
with assigned duties which included: (1) Coordination be¬ 
tween member states of the strictest implementation of the 
resolutions of the O.A.U. and (2) Harmonization of co¬ 
operation with friendly states as to implement an effective 
52 boycott against Portugal. 
-^Africa Research Bulletin 1 (July 1-31, 1964), p. 10?. 
52Ibid. 
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Commenting on the resolution of the African leaders at 
the conference, Sir Abubakar expressed the hope that all 
African states would assist in the speedy liberation of 
Southern Africa by making contributions to a special fund 
established by the O.A.U. to supply assistance to various 
African Liberation Movements. He declared, "South Africa 
and Portugal have become the Black sheep of the International 
Community. 
Further resolutions on Southern Africa were made in 
various conferences of African Heads of State and Council of 
Ministers in 1965. In one of such conferences held in Accra 
Ghana, the "Committee of Five" otherwise called O.A.U. Defense 
Committee was formed. This Committee which was composed of 
representatives from the U.A.R., Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya 
and Nigeria was given the responsibility of following up 
conference resolutions. 
In the Accra Conference, which lasted from October 21 
to 26, the Heads of State and Governments, agreed in prin¬ 
ciple on certain measures to be taken in case Ian Smith de¬ 
clared Rhodesia Independent of Britain. These measures were: 
(1) Refusal to recognize such independence, (2) Efforts to 
reconcile the two African Nationalist parties in Rhodesia- 
the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe 




government-in-exile and extending to it financial political, 
diplomatic and military assistance, (3) An emergency meeting 
of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers to consider further action 
including the most effective means of involving the United 
Nations. The Assembly recommended that member states should 
reconsider their political, economic, diplomatic and financial 
relations with Britain if she (Britain) accepted Zimbabwe's 
independence on the basis of minority rule.-^ 
On November 11, 1965, the white minority regime defied 
all odds and condemnations that might accompany a U.D.I. and 
siezed power from Britain. Following this move, Nigeria con¬ 
vened a meeting of the Committee of Five in order to advise 
on what line of action to take against Ian Smith.^ Although 
the Committee ended its deliberations without issuing a 
communique it convened the O.A.U. Council of Ministers to 
discuss the immediate steps to be taken on Rhodesia. 
At the meeting of the Council of Ministers, all indepen¬ 
dent African countries including Nigeria and excluding Libya 
which abstained, and Tunisia together with Kenya which ex¬ 
pressed reservations, supported a decision to break relations 
with Britain on December 1$, 1965 if it failed to crush the 
c n 
rebellion. 1 Certain members, Sierra Lerone in particular, 
54 Ibid. 
-^Africa Research Bulletin (October 1-31, 1965), p. 378. 
^R.C. Pratt, "Africa's Reaction to the Rhodesian 
Crisis," International Journal (Toronto) 21:2 (1966) p. 193. 
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wanted member states to withdraw from the Commonwealth. 
However, Nigeria which played a leading role during the con¬ 
ference later developed cold feet in its implementation of 
the resolutions. When the Nigerian Minister of External 
Affairs was asked on his return from the O.A.U. Council, if 
Nigeria would leave the Commonwealth, he replied, "There was no 
question of leaving the Commonwealth; we did not discuss this. 
What we said is that we will sever diplomatic relations if 
c' o 
our ultimatum is not respected. 
What infact happened was that only eight states ex¬ 
cluding Nigeria broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, 
while no single country withdrew from the Commonwealth. y 
This failure to achieve African unanimity in practice posed 
a grave threat to African solidarity and also exposed the 
0, A.U. to danger and decay. Attempts to hold further summits 
on Zimbabwe were abandoned since only seventeen countries 
agreed to participate. Nigeria gave no firm commitment to 
participating in such a conference. 
Now that details of the foreign policy initiative of 
the Balewa regime have been presented we may proceed to 
analyze them with a view to determining the extent to which they 
were commensurate with the capabilities available to Nigeria 
Despite Sir Abubakar's policy of anti colonialism, it 
has usually been said by enlightened Nigerians that his 
BO 
3 Radio Nigeria, Lagos, December 6, 1965. 
59 R.C. Pratt, "Africa's Reaction to the Rhodesia Crisis," 
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Southern African policy was not sufficiently dynamic. Al¬ 
though there were indications that his administration at 
times identified with racial elements in matters relating 
to Southern Africa, its overall Southern African policy was 
merely in form of gestures that were little more than sym¬ 
bolic in that no one expected them to yield the desired 
change of attitude on the part of racist governments in 
Southern Africa. Criticism of this nature often arise because 
of various contradictions in Sir Abubakar's policies. For 
instance despite all its verbal battles against Portuguese 
colonialism, the Abubakar regime continued to allow Portugal 
to have a Charge d'Affairs in Nigeria while other African 
countries refused to do so.^ It was only after much per¬ 
sistent domestic pressures and criticisms that Sir Abubakar 
grudingly withdrew recognition from the Portuguese Mission 
early in 1964.^ 
The Balewa Administration refused to train freedom 
fighters or accept the concept of an armed liberation strug¬ 
gle in Southern Africa as some leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere 
did. A practical example of the government’s general 
attitude occured in April 1962, when Mr. Holden Roberto, then 
the Head of the Angolan government-in-exile came to Lagos to 
seek military aid. Despite his much orchestrated recognition 
International Journal (Toronto) 2:2 (1966), p. 193. 
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H.R. Debates, April 6, 1964, Col. 1799. 
6lWest Africa (Januray 25, 1964), p. 103. 
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of Mr. Roberto's Government-in exile, the Prime Minister 
said, "We cannot assure you of training you to fight your 
African brothers in the South. This is far from the truth 
since the main target of the nationalists at the time was 
Portuguese colonialism. Sir Abubakar was rather looking for 
an alibi to deny military assistance to the Angolan national¬ 
ists . 
The most glaring contradict ion occured when in the 
form of a resolution in the Parliament, the Abubakar Govern¬ 
ment asked that: 
This House call on the Government to send a message 
of goodwill through the proper channel to the Rt. 
Hon. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great 
Britain for his tour of Africa and his statement 
against the attitude of the Government of South ^ 
Africa towards the race problems of that country. 
This was an indication that Sir Abubakar still believed in 
the infallibility of Britain but never believed that Britain 
had always been part of the problem in Southern Africa. Thus 
his close link with Britain remained a factor responsible for 
his inconsistency and lack of coherence in Nigeria's attitude 
toward Southern Africa. 
In addition, it is significant to note that the Abubakar 
administrâtion failed to implement the resolution on the boy¬ 
cott of South African goods. Despite the resolution on 
April 5» I960, to ban South African goods, Nigeria increased 
Relations," International Problems 12(0ctober, 1973), p. 54. 
Z* o 
^Claude Phillips, op. cit. , p. 179* 
^Daily Sketch (March 23, 1972), p. 8. 
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her imports from South Africa from 1,006,938 pounds sterling 
to 1,018,55° pounds while reducing her exports from 49,506 to 
7,97° pounds sterling.^ What these figures actually indicate 
is that despite the ban, South Africa had a favorable balance 
of trade over Nigeria. Therefore ironically, the ban was on 
Nigerian goods in South Africa. 
These aspects of Sir Abubakar's Southern African policy 
were consistent with his insistence that Nigeria's increasing 
commitments to Africa should not lead to a disruption of her 
relations with and commitments to the Western powers who 
incidentally, are deeply involved in Southern Africa. The 
Prime Minister made it plain that: 
Our national interest cannot best be served by a 
severance of pre-independence ties which raminate 
(sic) into several aspects of our national life 
particularly in the fields of trade, investments, 
aid, technical assistance, monetary relations, 
education and manpower development.°° 
In other words, the prime Minister was not prepared to pursue 
any firm anti-colonial and anti racist policies which would 
jeopardize his relations with the West. Therefore, it is 
quite obvious that Nigeria's economic and political stability 
during the Balewa administrâtion was at the mercy of the 
Western nations, particulary Britain. This situation fostered 
a lack of independence and sufficient dynamism in that regime's 
^Nigerian Trade Summary, The Chief Statistician, Lagos 
December, i960. 
^Quoted from the Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 
1:1 (July 1971). 
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handling of the crises in Southern Africa. 
Most probably, Abubakar's regime like other African 
governments took the initiative within the United Nations 
system to bring before the world body the plight of those 
Africans living under colonialism and apartheid, hoping there¬ 
by to build up a world opinion hostile to these practices. 
The feeling was that a body of international opinion hostile 
to these practices could bring a change in the political and 
economic order in Southern Africa. Thus Nigeria's votes in 
the U.N. during the first republic seemed impressive. However 
criticisms still arose because of various contradictions in 
Sir Abubakar's overall U.N. and O.A.U. activities in relation 
to Southern Africa. An outstanding incident that baffled 
African diplomats in the United Nations happened in 1961. 
Nigeria with all its verbal battles against colonialism, in 
October of that year, introduced a draft resolution which 
called for complete independence of African countries by 
December 1970. From the standpoint of other Afro-Asian states, 
only a resolution calling for immediate termination of 
Colonialism would have sounded diplomatically appropriate and 
reasonable. However the resolution was later withdrawn due 
to sustained hostility from these states. Nonetheless, lasting 
damage had been done to Nigeria's credibility as the giant of 
Africa. 
As if Sir Abubakar refused to learn his lesson, his 
administration discouraged the setting of any time table for 
the achievement of majority rule in Rhodesia. In his last 
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interview before he was killed in a military coup, the Prime 
Minister, in response to a question about what time would be 
appropriate for Rhodesia's independence replied, "There must 
be time for Africans to be trained and to gain experience... 
and there must be time for the whites to get used to the idea 
of majority rule. What you need is to arrive at a time when 
both sides can say that, after all, it's not too bad."^ 
Another glaring contradiction was the fact that 
Nigeria was at the fore front of the United Nations censure 
of South Africa in the fall of 1961. Mr. Wachukwu, the 
Nigerian Foreign Minister had earlier told the Nigerian House 
of Representatives that Nigeria would "want the Security 
Council to consider the possibility of expelling South Africa 
6 8 from the United Nations under article 6. But the same Foreign 
Minister refused to support a move by Afro Asian states to 
expel South Africa from the World body. Questioned about the 
explusion bid on a United States T.V. program a few days 
before it was put to vote, Mr. Wachukwu said, "She (South 
Africa) may expel herself but as far as I am concerned, censure 
69 is enough for the time being if this will make them think." 7
The inconsistencies in the Balewa administration's 
attitude towards South Africa were further exasperated by the 
^West Africa (January 29, 1966), p. 113* 
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°H.R. Debates (November 23, 1961), p. 14. 
^Newsweek (International) (October 23, 1961) p. 29. 
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repudiation of Wachukwu's opposition to South Africa's 
expulsion by Senator Nuhu Bamali, Minister of State for 
External Affairs. Senator Bamali said in a press conference 
at Ikeja Airport, Lagos, that no matter what Mr. Wachukwu had 
said at the U.N., "it is the determination of the Nigerian 
government to pursue consistently its policy of non- 
70 
fratanization with South Africa."' The Senator contended 
that Foreign Minister Wachukuwu's view of what action should 
be taken against South Africa was not that of the Federal 
Government. It is still impossible to reconcile the con¬ 
flicting opinions of these two government spokesmen since the 
Prime Minister refused to clarify the official position of 
his administration. In the case of Zimbabwe, despite all the 
high sounding rhetoric by Sir Abubakar that any rebellion 
(by Ian Smith) would be dealt with savagely, and that Nigeria 
would support any resolution that would bring down Ian Smith's 
regime, including the use of force, his administrât ion did not 
cooperate in the efforts to stop the rebellion. His refusal 
to break diplomatic relations with Britain, consistent with 
71 
the decisions of the Council of Ministers failed to generate 
confidence in the seriousness or competence of Nigeria's 
Southern African diplomacy. 
More often than not, Abubakar spoke deeply against 
^°West Africa (November 16, 1963), p. 1303* 
^See Africa Research Bulletin 1 (July 1-31» 1964), 
p. 107. 
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colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa. Under him, 
Nigeria's record at the United Nations showed disgust for 
such practices. Yet he was cautious and pragmatic due to 
his inability to overcome the inherent limitation of the 
psychology of colonialism. Therefore his administration's 
external policy swung from one end to another and back, both 
in content and style. 
Sir Abubakar's inconsistent and incoherent Southern 
African policy smacks of his inability to utilize Nigeria's 
capabilities to influence the racist regimes of Southern 
Africa and their mentors. It is also indicative of the 
perceptions the target countries had of those capabilities. 
Certainly these countries had a dire need for Nigeria's 
resources. However their need was offset by the Abubakar 
regimes's obsessive Western orientation which brought 
pressure to bear on the credibility of Nigeria's capabili¬ 
ties, thus limiting the degree of their responsiveness in 
the influence relationship. 
CHAPTER IV 
NIGERIA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA, 
1967-1979 
Section I 
While Sir Abubakar's Southern African policy has been 
described in the last chapter as inactive, overtly in¬ 
consistent and characterized by caution and conservatism 
despite his anti-colonial and anti-apartheid campaign, there 
is an attempt in this chapter to emphasize the more assertive 
role played by subsequent administrations since the Nigerian 
civil war. In other words, the data suggest that there were 
substantial changes in Nigeria's Southern African relations 
after the end of the civil war and that the anti-colonial- 
ant i-apartheid ideology of the post civilian regimes were 
far beyond the level of consciousness of the Balewa admin¬ 
istration. These changes which were products of the civil 
war experience and the skillful mobilization of Nigeria's 
capabilities are seen as gradually escalating during General 
Gowon's regime and becoming more pronounced during Murtala 
Muhammed/Obasanjo regimes from 1975-1979* 
The Gowon Regime (1967-1975) 
The initial period of General Gowon's administration 
(1967-1970) was an era replete with a civil war that dominated 
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Nigeria's domestic and foreign policy. Except for her anti¬ 
colonial and apartheid moves in the U.N., Nigeria during that 
period, could not initiate new moves against Southern African 
racist regimes. But the experience of the civil war in 
creased more than ever, Nigeria's determination to eradicate 
racialism, colonialism and imperialism from Africa. Ian 
Smith's Zimbabwe, South Africa and Portugal perceived the 
civil war as an instrument that could be utilized in the 
balkanization of Nigeria which they felt, constituted a 
potential threat to their survival."1' All three countries 
gave assistance and encouragement to Biafra in her efforts 
to secede from Nigeria. Lisbon became the headquarters of 
the Biafran European activities while South African and 
Zimbabwian pilots assisted in flying her planes. It was 
further disclosed that South African infantry mercenaries 
fought on the Biafran side against Nigeria. The Biafran Head 
of State, General Ojukwu lent some credibility to these 
allegations when he asserted that he would turn to the devil 
(meaning the racist trio) for assistance if that would save 
3 
Biafrans from extermination. 
The activities of the racist regimes also constituted 
a clever tactic not only to undermine African unity but also to 
divert the attention of the O.A.U. to Nigeria, thus weakening 
^Africa Report 13:2 (February 1968). 
2 
Ibid., Peter Schwab (ed), Biafra (New York: Garden 
City, 1971), p. 28. 
-^Oye Ogunbadejo, "General Gowon's African Policy," 
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the support that the organization was rendering to the 
African Liberation Movements in their war against them. 
This tactic almost paid off because despite the efforts of 
the O.A.U. to uphold the principle of nonintervention in 
the internal politics of member states, four of its members- 
Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia-openly broke 
ranks and accorded recognition to Biafra-while many more 
were sympathetic to the Biafran cause. 
Partly, as a result of this bitter experience, the post 
civil war regimes developed a sustained hatred against 
Southern African racist regimes. Under the leadership of 
General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria embarked on an activist and 
militant foreign policy. His administration established it¬ 
self as a leading African supporter of anti-colonial and 
liberation movements immediately after the end of the civil 
war. 
Portugal was the first victim of Nigeria’s militant 
moves against the racist regimes not only for her complicity 
with Biafra but also because of her collaboration with South 
Africa in her fight against the African nationalists in 
Southern Africa.^ At the O.A.U. summit meeting in Addis 
Ababa in June 1971» General Gowon urged the African leaders 
"to coordinate their efforts and liberate at least one 
International Studies (January to March, 1977), p. 37. 
It was learnt that soon after Dr. Marcello Caetano 
came to power in 1968 as the Portuguese Prime Minister, he 
reaffirmed his government support of Ian Smith’s regime and 
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Portuguese African territory within three years.To this 
effect, he suggested the creation of an African High Command 
and the establishment of a regional office of the O.A.U. 
liberation Committee in West Africa.^ In his reference to 
the colonized peoples of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and 
Angola, General Gowon was quoted as saying, 
For without their freedom and independence, there 
will be continued threat to the peace and security 
of Africa.... Africa’s supreme interests lie in the 
maintenance of our independence and in the total 
eradication of all forms of colonialism from the 
continent.7 
Also, in a radio broadcast to the nation on the occa¬ 
sion of the Eleventh Independence Anniversary celebration on 
October 1, 1971» the Head of State said inter alia, 
With the full knowledge and experience of the 
civil war behind us, we decided to pursue in 
every field of human endeavor, the objectives 
of our independence, unity and development with 
greater drive and clarity...to protest against 
colonialist activities in Africa (and) also to 
contribute promptly toward helping...to over- o 
come the consequences of Portuguese agression. 
also South Africa in their defense of Southern Africa. 
Evidence of their collaboration was the visit of the Supreme 
Commander of the South African Joint Armed Forces, General 
Frazier, to Mozambique in 1969, and South Africa's inten¬ 
sified material help to the Portuguese troops fighting in 
Mozambique. (For reference, see Commentaries 1:1 & 2 
(October, 1971)• 
Cest Africa 9 (July, 1971). p. 773. 
Plans for setting up the West African Office of the 
Liberation Movements were subsequently completed but the 
government seemed to have softened its position on African 
High Command perhaps due to opposition from other members of 
the O.A.U. See Africa Contemporary Record, 1972, p. B658. 
7Daily Times (Lagos) (December 10, 1970). 
Commentaries 2:1 & 2 (April-December, 1972). 
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The reflection of this attitude was on Nigeria's strong 
position over the Portuguese-assisted abortive Bay-of-Pigs- 
style invasion of the Republic of Guinea in 19?1* It was 
perhaps the first time that Nigeria unilaterally offered 
overt military assistance directly to any country.^ 
Certainly the liberation movements in the Portuguese 
territories so far had weakened Portugal's stranglehold before 
Nigeria's staunch opposition. Nevertheless General Gowon's 
militant stance posed an additional problem for Portugal. 
Initially its reaction to Nigeria's stance was contemptuous. 
However Portuguese army officers who fought in those African 
colonies soon realized that they were fighting a lost battle. 
Thus, in April 1974, General Spinola ousted dictator Caetano 
in a military coup d'etat and promised to accord independent 
status to the Portuguese colonies. In his letter to General 
Gowon who incidentally, was the chairman of the O.A.U. General 
Spinola stressed the determination of his new regime "to solve 
the African problem in accordance with the concepts prevailing 
in contemporary international society, and with strict regard 
for the self determination of all peoples, expressed through 
the sovereign will of the local population." He declared: 
In this political context, which surely coincides 
with the position of the member states of the 
O.A.U., I wish that the present messages contri¬ 
bute to the opening of new avenues of understand- 
o 
R.A. Akindele, "The Conduct of Nigeria's Foreign 
Relations," International Problems 7 (October 1973)» P* 69. 
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ing leading to a solution of the Portuguese 
problem in Africa within the framework of an 
effective solidarity among all African 
Peoples.10 
However the progressive elements in Portugal soon real¬ 
ized that General Spinola was never the revolutionary he 
claimed to be. Therefore he was in turn overthrown by 
General de Costa Gomes who eventually granted independence 
to the Portuguese territories.^ 
Under General Gowon, Nigeria took an equally strong 
position against the apartheid regime of South Africa. The 
initial criticism of South Africa by Gowon's regime was as a 
result of a British decision to resume arms sales to that 
country. General Gowon viewed this move as an open challenge to 
Africa and as a declaration of open support for apartheid by 
the British Government. Although he refused to commit himself 
in advance of the British decision, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, then the 
Nigerian external Affairs Minister, indicated before leaving 
for the Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore from 14 to 
22 January, 1971» that the Gowon administration would take 
whatever action "in the best interests of Nigeria" if Britain 
12 should decide to sell arms to South Africa. At the Common¬ 
wealth Conference, Nigeria joined an 8-nation Study Group set 
10Africa Research Bulletin No. 6 (1974), p. 3258. 
^Africa Report 19 (March-April, 1974), pp. 37-39; 
(May-June, 1974), pp. 6-10; "Portugal: Revolution and Counter 
Revolution," Labor Monthly 57 (November, 1975)» PP* 509-512* 
12Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, p. B658. 
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up to examine the security of maritime trade routes in the 
South Atlantic and Indian Oceans which were of vital 
importance for a large number of Commonwealth countries, but 
left when Britain announced her decision to sell arms to South 
Africa.^ 
It is in the light of General Gowon's animosity for 
South Africa that one should perceive his non-fraternization 
policy toward the proposal by Mr. Vorster of South Africa that 
Black African states engage in a political dialogue with his 
racist government which has all along refused such a dialogue 
with its Black population. The South African government 
headed by Mr. Vorster had earlier launched a diplomatic 
offensive to woo some African leaders into initiating a detente 
with South Africa. On September 15, 1970» he told Parliament 
that he was prepared to enter into a non-aggressive pact with 
any of the African states.^ Notwithstanding these over¬ 
tures however, General Gowon reaffirmed Nigeria's opposition 
to South Africa's apartheid regime "unless the regime 
abrogates its obnoxious Policy."1^ 
A number of African states led by Ivory Coast fell 
victim to Mr Vorster's overtures by accepting dialogue as a 
means of effecting a change of the philosophy of apartheid. 
^Daily Times (Lagos) (March 23, 1971), p. 3. 
^Africa Research Bulletin (September 30» 1970), 
p. 1862. 
■^Radio Nigeria (November 27, 1970). 
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However, on the insistence of the Gowon administration, the 
matter was brought before the O.A.U. where a resolution was 
adopted condemning any non-aggression pact with South Africa. 
Earlier, the Nigerian Government had deplored the meetings 
between Mr. Vorster and some of the African leaders. Such 
meetings, according to Dr. Okoi Arikpo, should be viewed as 
"clever tactics" which the racist regime could employ to 
further perpetuate its oppressive policies.1^ Thus Nigeria 
had headed off a diplomatic coup by South Africa that would 
have weakened the African countries* opposition towards 
apartheid. 
In the midst of Nigeria's diplomatic offensive against 
South Africa, an embarrassing rumour erupted in regard to 
certain Nigerian businessmen who allegedly were making trade 
contacts with South Africa, In order to avoid tarnishing 
Nigeria's image and credibility the federal Government 
immediately announced that it was investigating the report 
of these alleged contacts. The Head of state simultaneously 
warned of the "consequence of treachery" if the reports were 
proved to be true. He also warned that any embassy which made 
it possible for such unauthorized visits to be made by issuing 
visas, "would have itself to blame for any action the Federal 
Military Government might decide to take to protect the good 
^ Radio Nigeria, February 21, 1975* Quoted from Africa 
Research Bulletin (February 1-28, 1975)» P- 3523C. 
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name of Nigeria. The rumour was later dismissed by Dr. 
17 Arikpo, the External Affairs Commissioner as "unfounded." ' 
General Gowon equally never forgave the white suprem¬ 
acist government of Mr. Ian Smith not only because of its 
racist policies but also its complicity in Nigeria's civil 
war. Nigerians became more aware of the existence of Ian 
Smith's Government as a danger to the security of all African 
states. Like the O.A.U., Nigeria under General Gowon became 
more determined to work towards the attainment of Black 
majority rule in Zimbabwe. On March 12, 1971, the Gowon 
Administration publicly reaffirmed its support of the O.A.U. 
resolution of March 7» denouncing the illegal declaration as 
1 ft 
contrary to human or natural justice." 
In November 1971» after series of talks were held 
between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home 
and Mr. Ian Smith, a tentative agreement was reached purported¬ 
ly ending the Zimbabwian Independence crisis. But none of 
the Zimbabwian Black leaders was consulted in any meaningful 
way for their input in drawing up such a settlement that would 
control the lives of over five million Blacks in Zimbabwe. 
African states had earlier protested against the British 
17 1 There were serious speculations that certain Nigerian 
businessmen who had ties with the Gowon regime, were involved 
in the covert business. Incidentally the report of the in¬ 
vestigation was never released. See Adebisi op. cit., p. 83. 
-j O 
Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, p. B422. 
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delegation in Zimbabwe and had pointed out that the outcome 
of the talks with Ian Smith was not going to be popular with 
the African people. 
Expectedly,, the announcement of the settlement pro¬ 
posal precipitated strongly hostile reaction in Nigeria. 
The New Nigerian branded it British "deceit and hypocricy" 
and also viewed it as an "indelibly bad concluding chapter 
19 to the British colonial history in Africa." The Gowon 
Administration reacted with an uncompromising announcement 
that it would "reexamine its obligations to the Commonwealth," 
if Britain allowed independence before Black majority rule 
in Zimbabwe. Nigeria's threat to British interests, coupled 
with the negative responses throughout Africa, sounded the 
death knell of the so-called Angola-Rhodesian settlement 
proposals. 
In April 197^» Nigeria was found in the midst of a 
controversy that raged over a Zimbabwian based British 
multinational Company, Lonrho, retained on the advice of the 
O.A.U. General Secretary, Nzo Ekangaki as a consultant to 
the O.A.U. on African-Arab oil relations. The Nigerian 
position stood at odds with that of the Secretary-General 
who claimed that "Lonrho's views on Southern Africa were 
entirely coincidental with those of the O.A.U.," and there¬ 
fore threatened to resign if his decision on Lonrho was re- 
19 New Nigerian (November 26, 1971). 
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jected. Notwithstanding a potential major rift which might 
develop within the O.A.U. and the threat of resignation by 
the Secretary-General, the Gowon Administration, with the 
support of majority of the member states, stood its ground. 
Fortunately the potential rift was averted when the company 
20 decided to void the contract. 
On the other hand, General Gowon had in a few instances 
applied moderation in his anti-white minority stance. For 
instance, in his United Nations speech delivered on October 
1973» he used a conciliatory tone to appeal to the racist 
regimes for a re-evaluation of their policies. He declared, 
Nobody in Africa wishes to adopt the path of armed 
struggle and conflict against these minority re¬ 
gimes for the love of it; nobody asked that people 
who normally live in Africa and wish to consider 
themselves as part of Africa should, in any manner 
or means, be made to feel unwelcome to live in 
Africa, for they are Africans. 
In the same vein, General Gowon appealed to the South African 
and Zimbabwian regimes after the collapse of the Portuguese 
African empire to "take the cue" from the Portuguese. In 
his address delivered at the O.A.U. summit meeting in 
Somalia in his capacity as chairman, General Gowon indicated 
that the organization was prepared to give considerable time 
to those remaining Southern African regimes to reconsider 
. . 22 
their policies. 
2QAfrica Report 19 (March-April, 1974), p. 25. 
^^West Affrica (1974), p. 1470. 
22 
Ibid., p. 774. 
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It might be contended that the racist regimes did not 
deserve Gowon's conciliatory diplomatic moves since such 
actions had been tried by several Heads of African states 
without fruitful results. For instance while President 
Houphouet Boigny and a number of African rulers had accepted 
the idea of detente, President Tolbert had in his own 
initiative hosted Mr. Yorster in Liberia; and Dr. Kamuzu 
Banda, the Malawian President, had in actuality visited South 
Africa on a unilateral move to discuss apartheid with Prime 
23 Minister Vorster. 
Notwithstanding, General Gowon deserves commendation 
for his overall Southern African policy demonstrated in: 
(1) The rejection of British maneuver with regard to point 
by point majority rule in Zimbabwe (i.e. Anglo-Rhodesian 
Agreement, 1971); (2) Rejection of dialogue with South Africa 
even though several African countries accepted the offer; 
(3) Increase in Nigeria's influence over the O.A.U.'s 
stronger resolutions against the minority regimes of Southern 
Africa; and (4) The overt material assistance to liberation 
movements, particularly those in the former Portuguese 
territories. Certainly General Gowon improved the old image 
of Nigeria, thus winning the confidence of states like Guinea 
24 
and Tanzania as Black Africa's greatest nation. Generally, 
^Africa Research Bulletin (February 1-28, 1975 ) 
p. 3525. 
2 4 
Adebisi, op. cit., p. 82. 
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it is the contention of many students of Nigerian foreign 
policy that it was General Gowon who prepared the foundation 
on which the superstructure of Nigeria's present militant 
and agressive African policy is based. 
Muhammed/Obasan.jo Regime 1975-1979 
The bloodless coup of July 1975 brought General 
Murtala Muhammed into power as Nigeria's Head of state. The 
task of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation 
(as a result of the civil war) which at times affected General 
Gowon's foreign policy decisions had been virtually completed. 
Therefore the advent of General Muhammed's regime brought 
with it, a more dynamic Southern African policy which 
translated into what his administration described as "the 
permanent interest of Nigeria and the higher interest of the 
2e! continent of Africa." Observers wondered what this would 
entail. The first real test of his administration was the 
Angolan crisis which started as a result of Portugal's un¬ 
ceremonious and sudden withdrawal from that country without 
helping to settle the question of succession between the 
contending nationalist groups in Angola. Since General 
Murtala continued to nurse serious grievances against the 
Southern African racist redoubts for their role in the Nigerian 
civil war, Angola offered an avenue for his administration to 
25 
Federal Nigeria (October-December, 1976), p. 6 
2 6 uAfter the Portuguese left, a power vacuum was created 
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demonstrate a tougher Nigerian policy stance which would 
pressure the Western countries and their Southern African 
allies into a reassessment of their policies. 
After independence was granted to Angola, a major 
crisis began which opened up a new chapter in international 
affairs. The three liberation movements with the support of 
the O.A.U. agreed at the eve of independence to form a govern¬ 
ment of national unity in the Alvor agreement of January 
27 
15» 1975- However such a unified national government was 
repugnant to the counter-insurgency scenario of United 
States C.I.A. and Dr. Henry Kissinger, then the American 
Secretary of State whose objective was to insure that forces 
friendly to the United States should take power to safe- 
2 8 
guard the mineral and energy resources of Angola. Besides, 
Angola is strategically located next to Zaire, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, all allies of the Western World. 
There was the fear in the West European and American circles 
that the MPLA which received support from the Soviet Union 
would constitute a threat to their interests if it were 
allowed to play a significant role in the Angolan govern¬ 
ment. Hence South Africa, with the approval of the U.S., 
initiated a move in support of U.N.I.T.A. and FNLA, the 
2^Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-1975» pp. B539; 
C217. 
2 8 Apart from the American Banking Community, American 




lackeys of the Western Camp. 7
It was ironic that South Africa, of all countries, was 
involved in a war for the "freedom" of an African country. 
Such an alliance between African nationalist groups and South 
Africa caused those groups Africa's support. President 
Nyerere condemned it in the strongest terms.Vorster's 
apartheid regime had again convincingly demonstrated with 
this expansionist tendency that it could easily pose a threat 
to the security of African states. Earlier, Nigeria, like the 
O.A.U., was in favor of the formation of a government of 
national unity in Angola pursuant to the Kampala Summit 
resolution.-^1 But it soon realized that it was no longer 
possible to pursue a policy of reconciliation of the warring 
parties since there was abundant evidence of South African 
troops in the conflict. General Muhammed felt that the 
success of South Africa in establishing a puppet government 
in Angola would constitute a danger to the future of African 
solidarity and would likewise cripple African nationalist 
activities mounted towards the total liberation of Africa. 
29 7There were numerous reports that the U.S. and South 
Africa collaborated in sending South African troops to 
Angola in their quest to put the MPLA troops in disarray. 
See New York Times (January 25, 1976); Newsweek (May 1?, 1976). 
-^Southern Africa (February 1976), p. 10. 
31 v Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War 
On Southern Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 
1972), pp. 9-10. 
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He also realized that the factions fighting against 
the M.P.L.A. were backed not only by South Africa but also 
by other interests which were obviously against Angolan 
independence and freedom in the continent of Africa. 
Therefore Nigeria was left with no choice but to recognize 
the M.P.L.A. on November 26, 1975 in preference to the FNLA/ 
U.N.I.T.A. alliance which had violated the O.A.U. charter 
by joining forces with racist South Africa. 
During his visit to Lagos, Angola's Prime Minister 
Nascimento brought two of four South African soldiers captured 
deep inside Angola a few days earlier, thus confirming the 
strong backing of Nigeria for the MPLA. General Muhammed in 
turn, delivered an address which clearly underscored Nigeria's 
position vis-a-vis the Angolan situation. He said, 
Our Brothers and Sisters of Angola:....I want to 
assure you that in your hour of need, we are 
solidly behind you in your efforts not only to 
stand alone but give respectability and dignity 
to the black race....We in Nigeria are committed 
to the total liberation of the whole of Africa 
and we will not fold our hands to see our 
brothers and sisters in Angola subjugated, ex¬ 
ploited and recolonized by the racials and 
imperialists in South Africa and their supporters. 
Never will any liberated African soil be colonized 
again. 
Your struggle is therefore our struggle and we 
will support you both morally and materially 
until absolute victory is gained in Angola. In 
the traditional African way of life, we believe 
we are our brothers' keepers. 
the 
32 v In this instance, the Western nations, 
U.S., were implicated as accomplices. 
parti cularly 
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We recognize that the MPLA truly represents the 
interests of the Angolan people and the African 
interests. We condemn in the strongest terms, 
external influences colluding together to 
subvert and destroy the Angolan unity and the 
welfare of the Angolan people. We believe in 
and uphold the stand of the MPLA in striving 
to build a truly independent African nation, 
free to pursue independent and non-aligned 
policies in international affairs and within 
the country of nations....I therefore appeal to 
all our brothers and sisters in Angola wherever 
they are and whatever their persuasion to unite 
and face a common enemy that is threatening to 
destroy and devour them.33 
During Prime Minister Nascimento's visit, the Nigerian Head 
of state demonstrated Nigeria's strong support for the MPLA 
by giving it financial assistance of 20 million dollars 
(about 13.5 million naira).J Although it was not confirmed 
by Nigerian officials, Prime Minister Nascimento announced 
on his return from the visit that this sum was the first 
installment of 100 million dollars worth of financial 
assistance promised by the Nigerian leader. 
Nigeria's action which was often described as "the 
oxygen of MPLA offensive 33 forced President Gerald Ford not 
only to dispatch an envoy on "an arm twisting" mission to 
Africa but also to address "overbearing circular letters" 
to all African Heads of State suggesting that the forthcoming 
O.A.U. Council of Ministers and Summit Conference should 
33 -^Daily Times (Lagos), Saturday 
34 
Times International (Nigeria) 
35Ibid. 
(December 20, 1975). 
(January 19, 1976), 
p. 4. 
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insist on the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military 
advisers "as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of the racist 
South African occupation forces.3^ The Nigerian Federal 
Military Government viewed this action as "an insult to the 
intelligence of African nations" and "a scorn to the dignity 
of the Black man." It urged African nations to reject such 
a "directive" by sounding a note that "gone are the days 
when Africa ever bowed to the threat of any so-called super 
power."33 Thus, Nigeria's support for the MPLA became a 
diplomatic life-line for the Angolan government. Within a 
few weeks after its recognition of MPLA as the legitimate 
representative of the Angolans, an overwhelming number of 
African countries, through Nigeria's diplomatic pressure lined 
up behind Dr. Neto, (the Angolan President). Their support 
effectively ended the "limping O.A.U. policy of abortively 
reconciling three contending groups. The Organization of 
African Unity on February 11, 1976, officially recognized 
the MPLA proclaimed People's Republic of Angola (P.R.A.) as 
a member of the Organization. 
Obviously as a result of policy difference over the 
civil war in Angola, relations between Nigeria and the U.S. 
during President Ford's administration reached a low ebb. 
Demonstrations were staged in the cities of Kaduna and Ibadan 
^Federal Ministry of Information Release, No. 16, 
January 6, 1976). 
37Ibid. 
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in Nigeria against the U.S. policy. These demonstrations 
were followed by an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Lagos on 
January 11, 1976. Also after the abortive coup of February 
13, 1976, in which General Muhammed was assassinated, demon¬ 
strators attacked the British High Commission and the U.S. 
Embassy, claiming Western complicity in the plot. Nigeria 
refused to receive Dr. Kissinger during his African tour in 
April 1976 to follow up the Ford Administration's campaign 
against Russian and Cuban presence in Africa. The Nigerian 
Federal Military Government also ordered the closure of the 
O O 
U.S. radio monitoring station in Kaduna.7 These highly 
publicized actions added a new dimension to Nigeria's efforts 
to influence the Western bloc. 
The foiled coup aggravated the downturn in Anglo- 
Nigerian relations. The Nigerian Government headed by General 
Obasanjo stated that Nigeria's special relationship with 
Britain no longer existed. This was confirmed in a press 
conference in Kenya on his way home from a Summit Conference 
of the O.A.U. in Mauritius, when the Nigerian Foreign Affairs 
Commissioner said that "Our relations with Britain are as 
39 
good as with any other country.Such a position was in 
-^Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-1976, p. B799* 
-^Nigerian Tide (July 9» 1976), p. 16. Partly because 
of the strain in Anglo-Nigerian relations, Nigeria sold most 
of her pound sterling, reducing the reserves before the end 
of 1975 from 1000 million pounds sterling down 300 million, 
thus adding to the ruin of the British pound sterling in 1976. 
(See Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-1976, p. B799* 
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sharp contrast to the pro-Western lack-luster posture of 
Nigerian foreign policy under Sir Abubakar. 
The Federal Military Government did not waver in its 
resolve to support the freedom of blacks in Southern Africa 
despite the untimely death of General Muhammed. His successor, 
General Obasanjo, in a broadcast to the nation immediately 
after the coup, gave the assurance that Nigeria would 
continue "to pursue a vigorous and dynamic foreign policy for 
tin 
the solidarity and total independence of Africa." He 
assured a special envoy who delivered a message of con¬ 
dolence to him from President Neto of Angola that Nigeria, 
under his leadership, was "fully committed to Angola and 
would continue to support Angola to solidify its independence 
and territorial integrity. Hence the Obasanjo Administration 
established a training program for Angolan students for 
the pursuit of various areas of study in Nigeria's institutions. 
Simultaneously two Nigerian petroleum engineers were assigned 
to help restore the crude oil production activities in the 
4l newly independent Angola. These were efforts to redeem 
Angola from an acute shortage of manpower and material re¬ 
sources as a result of many years of colonial exploitation. 
Thus in concrete terms, the success of the MPLA in Angola 
40 i Ministry of Information Release, No. 304, March 5» 
1976. 
^Daily Times (Nigeria), May 19, 1976, p. 16. 
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which culminated into effective government was perceived in 
political circles as Nigeria's first victory over imperialist 
f orces. 
Nigeria's support during the Obasanjo administration 
was not limited to on]y Angola. The Nigerian Head of State 
equally assured Mozambicans that they could always count on 
Nigeria's support in their struggle to safeguard their hard- 
won independence. He used the occasion of his visit to 
Mozambique in September 197? to admonish the minority re¬ 
gimes of Southern Africa when in his address to the populist 
rally in Maputo, he said, "Your frontiers of freedom must be 
4 2 
extended beyond the borders of Mozambique." Before this 
visit, General Obasanjo had given financial assistance of 
one million naira to help Mozambique offset losses she might 
sustain as a result of the closure of her border with the 
43 
minority regime in Zimbabwe. 
As regards South Africa, both Generals Muhammed and 
Obasanjo happened to be military commanders in various war 
fronts where apartheid South Africa was suspected of aiding 
and abetting Biafra's attempt to secede from Nigeria. To 
them therefore, South Africa became an enemy state not only 
as a result of her racist ideology but also her contribution 
42 
Ibid., Tuesday, September 6, 1977. 
43 
^Mozambique closed her border with Zimbabwe in pro¬ 
test against the racist policies of Mr. Ian Smith, thus losing 
some revenue that hitherto acrued from Zimbabwe for the 
usage of her ports. 
10? 
to the efforts to dismember the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
In May 1976, under the leadership of General Obasanjo, 
Nigeria launched a Reconstituted Committee for the Dissemi- 
44 nation of Information on the Evils of Apartheid. Its 
major function was to "educate and inform" the Nigerian 
public on the evils of apartheid so that it would be 
appreciative of whatever actions taken by the Federal Govern¬ 
ment in its battle against racism. Already the Nigerian public 
could appreciate the plight of black people of Southern 
Africa. However the increased tempo in the liberation struggle 
in Southern Africa and Nigeria's more dynamic posture in 
international relations made it more imperative that such a 
committee to rejuvinated. 
Equally important is the fact that the Obasanjo 
administration pari-passau, launched the Southern African 
Relief Fund in Nigeria, with an official donation of about 
7 million naira, to aid the blacks of Southern Africa in their 
struggle "for freedom and dignity." The government appealed 
to public servants to contribute 2 percent of their April 
4< 
salaries of 1977 to this fund. J Through the collection of 
this fund and the education of the Nigerian public on the 
evils of apartheid, General Obasanjo's Government made an 
overwhelming number of Nigerians more aware of the situation 
A similar committee existed in the past but later 
became virtually defunct. 
^West Africa (March 28, 1977)* 
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in Southern Africa and thereby winning greater sympathy for 
the liberation cause. 
Nigerian government embarked on a massive enrollment 
of Southern African students in Nigerian schools and colleges 
at Nigeria's expense. The first batch of 86 Southern African 
refugees who fled from the racist regimes arrived in Nigeria to 
continue their education in various centers. Forty six of 
these students were from Soweto in South Africa while the 
rest were Zimbabwians who escaped the oppressive regime of 
46 the Smith regime. 
Furthermore, in an irrevocable stand against apartheid 
and racism, Nigeria withdrew from the Olympic Games held in 
Montreal, Canada, in protest against New Zealand’s partici¬ 
pation. This action was taken because New Zealand allowed 
her nationals to mount an athletic tour of apartheid South 
Africa especially at a time when the massacre of Africans in 
Soweto^ was still fresh in memory, thus underscoring its 
insensitivity to African humiliation and degradation. In 
actuality Nigeria's action was in compliance with a resolution 
adopted at the thirteenth O.A.U. Summit conference that member 
states should boycott the Olympics unless the international 
46 Several more students from Southern Africa were ex¬ 
pected to be enrolled. See Federal Nigeria 3:1 (April-June 
1977), P. 6. 
47 'This involved large scale killings and wounding of 
Africans including school children by the South African 
police when the former were demonstrating against racial 
discrimination in Soweto on June 16, 1976. 
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Olympic Committee (I.O.C.) "prevailed upon New Zealand to 
withdraw from the games on account of her sporting links 
48 
with the racist South African regime." Nevertheless the 
response was unlike the negative type given to the re¬ 
solution of the Council of Ministers of the O.A.U. in late 
1965 stipulating that member states should break diplomatic 
relations with Britain if she refused to crush Ian Smith's 
regime. The pull-out of Nigeria from the Olympics marked 
the beginning of the withdrawal of other African countries. 
In another instance, a few weeks before the Carter 
administration took office, the Nigerian Commissioner for 
External Affairs, Brigadier Garba took a jibe at the United 
States in a categorical statement, warning it against any 
military pact with South Africa. In a statement issued in 
Masaru, Lesotho in December 1976, The Commissioner revealed 
that there had been talks of a defense agreement between the 
United States and the South African Government, "ostensibly 
to ensure the protection of the Cape of Good Hope against an 
’imaginary' invader." He argued that "the so-called defense 
of the Cape route...was a calculated issue to consolidate the 
racist stronghold in the face of mounting pressure for change 
within South Africa itself." Brigadier Garba warned, "It is 
our view that a defense pact with the apartheid regime will 
48 
Federal Ministry of Information Release, No. 860, 
July l6, 1976. 
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be regarded by the whole of Africa as an act of aggression 
4 Q 
against the continent." 
Already South Africa has been boasting of nuclear 
capability. Whether this is merely a braggadocio or reckless 
blackmail, there is no doubt that the Western nations would 
stop at nothing to protect their interests in South Africa, 
even if their actions violate the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty.NATO is also allegedly actively involved militarily 
with South Africa. There has lately been a resounding evidence 
of the inclusion of the use of that organization's system of 
codification of military equipment in South Africa's military 
<1 
communication's system. 
The Obasanjo regime, was perceived by Mr, Vorster as 
nothing but a thorn in the flesh of his apartheid government. 
Therefore he was reportedly planning to invade Nigeria "as a 
reprisal for the nation's new dynamic foreign policy in 
Africa and the backing given to liberation struggle in South 
49Ibid., No. 1246 (October 22, 1975). 
-^Of course the mere fact that South Africa is not a 
party to such a treaty eliminates any compunctions in their 
decisions to convert her nuclear plants into military arsenals 
in utter violation of U.N. Resolution 2033 (XX) which 
stipulates that all nations respect the continent of Africa 
as a nuclear free zone. Nigeria's reaction was to demand the 
expulsion of South Africa from the International Atomic Energy 
See Daily Times (Lagos), September 24, 1976, p. 9* 
Federal Ministry of Information Release, No. 1246, 
October 22, 1975* 
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Africa." This revelation was made by Mr. Oliver Tambo, 
President of the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) of South 
Africa who was on a visit to Nigeria. 
In spite of South Africa's threats, the Obasanjo 
Administration maintained its pressure on South Africa. As 
a further demonstration of its deep commitment to the solution 
of the problem of apartheid, Nigeria hosted the Conference 
on World Action Against Apartheid in Lagos in August 1977* 
During the Conference, a Program of Action, otherwise known 
as "Lagos Declaration," was adopted which would go a long way 
to dislodge the inhuman racist machinery run by South Africa." 
It was at this conference that General Obasanjo revealed that 
Nigeria had established an economic intelligence unit which 
would report on businesses dealing with South Africa and 
recommend the sanctions which they would face. Specifically 
the Head of State was referring to those enterprises that 
depoidedon Nigeria's raw materials and markets but continued 
to help those regarded as Nigeria's "enemies." He warned, 
"Such enterprises must decide now to choose between us and 
CL 
our enemies and all that goes with their choice."^ It was 
52Sunday Sketch (Nigeria), November 28, 1976, pp. 1-2. 
^Nigeria at the U.N. (An Annual Magazine of the 
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the U.N.), 1977» p. 2. 
^West Africa (August 29» 1977)» P* 175^* Foreign 
Construction companies who were known to have connections 
with South Africa already had been barred from participating 
in economic transactions in Nigeria. 
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earlier disclosed that the Union Trading Company (U.T.C.)» 
a foreign owned company in Nigeria had business connections 
with South Africa. On investigation, large quantities of 
assorted South African goods were discovered and confiscated.^ 
In 1979» Nigeria again flexed its commercial muscles 
in the course of international politics by nationalizing 
British Petroleum (B.P.) assets. This company was allegedly 
exporting Nigeria's oil covertly to South Africa. With this 
move, B.P. lost its entitlement to almost 300»000 barrels a 
day of Nigerian oil and thus forcing up prices in Europe 
where most of the B.P. oil goesNigeria's action was also 
as a result of the sour nature of Anglo-Nig erian relations 
caused by Mrs. Thatcher’s initial insensitivity to the question 
of majority rule in Zimbabwe.^ 
The situation in Namibia where the South African govern¬ 
ment has continued to perpetuate its strangehold, continues 
to deteriorate. The racist regime has no difficulty in 
flouting the resolutions of the United Nations due to un¬ 
flinching support from its Western allies, who due to the 
usual economic reason, continue to equivocate over the need 
to return the territory to political legitimacy. 
Ironically it was these Western allies, including the 
^Nigeria Standard, February 17, 1977» P* 3 • 
^^West Africa (August 6, 1979)» P* 1399- 
57Ibid. 
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United Kingdom, France, West Germany, U.S.A. and Canada 
(the so-called Western contact Group), who decided in 1977 
to abandon Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976 on Namibia 
and embarked on a private initiative to search for a solution 
to the Namibian question. The efforts resulted into the ill 
fated "Proximity Talks" held in New York on February 1978.^® 
Expectedly the South African government raised all sorts of 
"red herrings" to hinder the progress of the negotiations. 
Nigeria viewed all these developments with great 
concern. Together with the front line states, 7 it had all 
along actively supported various initiatives seeking 
negotiated solutions to the Namibian question. But the 
failure of the Western Contact Group to devise any acceptable 
formula for a settlement dampened Nigeria's eagerness for a 
peaceful solution. The Obasanjc Administrâtion had earlier 
given permission to the South West African Peoples Organi¬ 
zation (SWAPO), the only nationalist movement in Namibia, to 
open an office in Nigeria^0 since such proximity would 
facilitate easy and prompt coordination of activities be¬ 
tween Nigeria and the nationalist group. Then with the 
stalling of the talks, Nigeria promised to render to SWAPO, 
"every possible diplomatic and other assistance." This 
-^Nigeria at the U.N., 1978, p. 
■^^These include Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique. 
^°New Nigeria (April 6, 1976), pp. 1-2. 
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gesture was described by Mr. Nujoma, the President of SWAPO 
as a wonderful inspiration and encouragement to the people 
of Namibia. ^>"1' 
Zimbabwe posed another nagging problem for the Federal 
Military Government of General Obasanjo. The first major 
Western diplomatic maneuver in relation to Zimbabwe during 
Obasanjo’s tenure was Dr. Henry Kissinger's proposal in 
1976 aimed at bringing majority rule to that country. The 
clearest summary of his proposal was spelled out in his 
Lusaka address in which he emphasized ten major points 
dealing with not only Zimbabwe, but also Namibia and South 
Africa.4" It was believed that the new reality of a major 
Soviet and Cuban military presence in Southern Africa, and 
the fall of both Angola and Mozambique to regimes sympathet¬ 
ic to the Soviet Union, caused the Ford Administration, under 
the leadership of Henry Kissinger as the Secretary of State 
to launch the so-called "majority rule approach" or new 
African policy. Therefore the Nigerian government never 
regarded the maneuver as a "positive response" to the yearnings 
of the majority of the Zimbabwians but rather a "diplomatic 
ruse" to confer legality and international respectability 
to the illegal regime of Ian Smith. The Nigerian Federal 
Government spoke out in condemnation of such an initiative 
6lIbid. 
^2New York Times, April 29, 1976. 
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which surfaced not only as a reaction against the so-called 
Soviet and Cuban influence but also a reaction designed to 
halt the military successes of the nationalists fighting in 
Zimbabwe. Besides, Kissinger's mission was doomed to failure 
from the point of view of his refusal to deal directly with 
the liberation movements. 
Meanwhile, the Obasanjo administration made a donation 
of about 13^,000 Naira toward the liberation struggle in 
Zimbabwe. At the same time, Dr. Joshua Nkomo, one of the 
Zimabwian nationalist leaders flew into Nigeria to "brief 
the Head of state" on the situation in that country. J During 
this visit, the Nigerian Head of State stressed Nigeria's 
unflinching support for the Zimbabwian nationalists. 
In April 1977» David Owen, new British Foreign Minister 
introduced a fresh Anglo-American settlement initiative, 
culminating in the publication in September of new settle¬ 
ment proposals for Zimbabwe. Although the Patriotic Front 
Alliance led by Joshua Nkomo and Mugabe criticized it for 
its inherent imperfections, General Obasanjo and the Front 
line Heads of state decided to give it a chance on the 
premise that so far, it provided the only reasonable basis 
for negotiation. It was reported that the Nigerian govern¬ 
ment at that time had reached a working understanding with 
the Patriotic Front as well as the U.S. and Britain. The 
63 Federal Nigeria 3:1 (April-June, 1977), p. 6. 
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U.N. Peace-Keeping Force which the plan also called for, would 
be composed with a balance that would give Nigeria a "pre- 
64 pondérant weight." 
The Nigerian Government threw its full weight in support 
of the proposals at a time when it was still unpopular with 
the nationalist groups and most African states because the 
government believed that it (the proposal) contained a 
workable formula for resolving the crisis peacefully. However 
when Ian Smith dawdled over the acceptance in its entirety 
and also when it became clear that neither Britain nor U.S. 
was prepared to back up the proposals, Nigeria discovered the 
futility of her support. 
As an alternative to the proposals, Ian Smith pro¬ 
posed what he termed an "Internal Settlement" consumated with 
the support of some moderate black leaders in Zimbabwe.^ The 
"Internal Settlement" talks produced an agreement reached on 
February 15» 1978, and endorsed on March 3, for an eventual 
majority rule on December 31, 1978. 
The Patriotic Front Alliance was excluded from this 
agreement. Moreover majority of Blacks in Zimbabwe were not 
given an opportunity to understand the principles of the 
64 
For details of the Plan, See Africa Research Bulletin, 
(September 1*30, 1977), p. 4555» 
^These moderate black leaders include Sithole, Bishop 
Muzorewa and Chief Jeremiah Chirau. 
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constitution on which a general election was based for the 
installation of majority rule. Despite such flagrant violation 
of democratic principles, there were various moves by the 
Western countries, particularly U.S. and Britain for the 
66 lifting of economic sanctions0 against Zimbabwe and eventual 
recognition on the basis of the Internal Settlement. These 
moves drew the wrath of most African countries including 
Nigeria which condemned such negation of basic human rights. 
It was at this level of the crisis that Nigeria demonstrated 
an outstanding brilliance in international diplomacy. 
Nigeria unequivocally warned against the Internal 
Settlement. In the United Nations General Assembly, Brigadier 
Garba succintly stated, "We oppose it, we condemn and we want 
zf ry 
to kill it because it is a recipe for civil war." ' Mrs. 
Thatcher's threat to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe and re¬ 
cognize Bishop Muzorewa's government drew hostile reactions 
from the Obasanjo regime. Some British firms were removed on 
the order of the Nigerian Federal Government from consideration 
for major construction tenders in Nigeria. This involved a 
major British construction consortium comprising Costain, 
Cementation International and Balfour Beatty which had been 
informed of the cancellation of its tender for Nigerian port 
These were the U.N. economic sanctions imposed in 
1966 as a result of Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence. 
6 7 
'West Africa (June 5, 1978), p. 1090. 
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68 development. It was expected that Nigeria's reaction would 
galvanize more hostile moves by some Afro-Asian countries 
against the British. Moreover, outside Europe and North 
America, Nigeria is Britain's leading market. Between 197? 
and 1978, British exports to Nigeria was in excess of $2 
billion, thus making Nigeria Britain's leading market in 
Africa. 7 Therefore Britain had no choice but to swallow 
her pride. 
The United States was also tempted to lift sanctions 
and accord recognition to Zimbabwe. The Senate on two occa¬ 
sions voted to put these actions into effect. However Nigeria's 
use of her mineral oil as a weapon against such moves became 
a factor which the United States had to contend with.9*^ 
Under these circumstances, Britain in particular, 
decisively initiated a working formula for political in¬ 
dependence which became acceptable to all parties in the 
Zimbabwian conflict. A constitutional conference on Zimbabwe 
was held at the Lancaster House, London, from September 10 
to December 17, 1979» On December 21, 1979» the Patriotic 
Front and the illegal regime in Zimbabwe, reached an agree¬ 
ment on a new constitution, a transition period and a cease- 
68 
Ibid., No. 3230 (June 11, 1979), P- 1048. 
69Ibid. 
70 
' Over 30 percent of the U.S. imports of crude oil 
comes from Nigeria. See Nigeria in the U.N. (1976), p. 35- 
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fire.^"*" The Nigerian representative at the U.N. Security 
Council Debate on Zimbabwe, Mr. B. Akporode Clark described 
it as "the results of collective wisdom and sense of realism 
of those who took part in them...attribute to the deligence, 
perseverance and patriotism of the Patriotic Front leaders, 
. 72 who above all, made the agreement possible."' 
Section II 
International Agencies and Nigeria’s Foreign 
Policy Towards Southern Africa: The 
U.N. and the O.A.U., 1967-1979 
Like the Balewa regime, the military regimes attempted 
to use Interantional organizations including the U.N. and the 
O.A.U. as a forum for the expression of their policies 
towards Southern Africa. They recognized that these organi¬ 
zations could not serve as a substitute for power politics, 
or as sole catalysts for the eradication of apartheid and 
colonialism in that region. Nevertheless they felt that their 
votes could be effective in arousing the world conscience 
against such evils. 
71 For the details of the constitution refer to: Journal 
of Southern African Affairs (1979)» 
72 ' See statement delivered by His Excellency, Mr. B. 
Akporode Clark at the Security Council Debate on Zimbabwe on 
December 21, 1979- ( A publication of the Permanent Mission 
of Nigeria to the U.N.). 
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The United Nations 
Unlike the Abubakar Administration which could not 
maintain a firm policy stance in the U.N. vis-a-vis Southern 
Africa, the post civil war regimes were known to have con¬ 
sistently utilized the same organization as a rallying point 
for the expression of their uncomprising commitments to the 
eradication of the racialist regimes of Southern Africa. 
Immediately after the end of the Civil War, Dr. Okoi Arikpo 
demonstrated this commitment not only through his U.N. vote 
reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to 
freedom and independence but also through his stern warnings 
during the debate on South Africa which ended with a General 
Assembly Declaration on Colonialism and Apartheid. In an 
address to the twenty fifth General Assembly, Dr. Arikpo 
clearly stated that the West should choose between helping 
to eradicate apartheid and retaining Africa's friendship, 
and staining "their hands with the precious blood of our 
73 
people until we can tolerate them no longer."' 
Nigeria did not play a very active role in the United 
Nations during the civil war. With a domestic problem of 
that magnitude, she seemed more concerned with mending her 
own fences. On the other hand, not many draft resolutions 
on Southern Africa were introduced by members of the Organi¬ 
zation during that time. The major concern of members con- 
^Daily Times (October 17, 1970), p. 40. 
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tinued to center on Zimbabwe and the unilateral declaration 
of independence by Ian Smith. 
On October 27, 196?, Nigeria sponsored a draft re¬ 
solution (A/C.^/L.870) condemning the refusal of Britain to 
take effective measures to bring down the illegal racist 
minority regime. The draft resolution stipulated that 
sanctions, to be effective, must be comprehensive, mandatory, 
and backed by force. It also condemned the continued support 
given the regime by South Africa and Portugal. 
In his address during a General Debate, the Nigerian 
representative, Mr. Olutoye scornfully stated that "no one 
had been taken by surprise by the unilateral declaration of 
7/4, 
independence, except perhaps the United Kingdom Government." 
He declared, "Being assured that that Government would not 
use force against him, Mr. Smith had carried out his plans 
and siezed power. Rejecting the use of force, the United 
Kingdom Government had taken it upon itself to dictate what 
economic, political and diplomatic sanction ought to be 
imposed against the Salisbury regime, at what movement, and 
in what circumstances. It was no wonder that the policy of 
selective sanctions had failed and that Mr. Smith was still 
firmly in the saddle." The Nigerian resolution was finally 
^A/C. 4/SR. 1695 • 
75Ibid. 
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adopted by a vote of 92 to 2, with 18 abstentions.^ 
During 1968, Zimbabwe received further consideration 
by the General Assembly, and the Security Council. On 
March 12, 1968, Nigeria and 37 other African states, gravely 
concerned that the selective mandatory sanctions which were 
imposed on Zimbabwe by the Security Council against the 
77 illegal regime in 1966'' had failed to prevent trade with 
that regime, wrote a letter requesting an urgent meeting of 
the Security Council to examine the situation in Zimbabwe. 
The meeting was held on May 29, 1968 and as usual, the 
Security Council reaffirmed its resolutions 216(1965) of 
November 1965* 221(1966) of 9"th April, 1966 and 232(1966) of 
16th December 1966. 
Furthermore, Nigeria and 35 other member states sub- 
7 R 
mitted a draft resolution' in the General Assembly express¬ 
ing the view that coercive measure and force should be used 
by Britain to end the Smith rebellion. Expressing Nigeria's 
support for this move, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, then the Nigerian 
foreign Minister reiterated that "It is over eighteen months 
since both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. 
^Resolution 2262 (XXII). 
^Y.U.N., 1966, pp. 116-117, text of resolution 232 
(1966). 
78 ’A/C.4/L. 908/Rev. 1. 
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Since that time we have found that the diplomatic and man¬ 
datory economic sanctions so far applied under chapter VII 
of our Charter against the illegal minority regime of Ian 
79 Smith have been of no significant avail."'  Subsequently 
o o 
the General Assembly passed a "watered down" resolution 
calling upon all states not to recognize any form of in¬ 
dependence in Zimbabwe without the prior establishment of a 
government based on majority rule in accordance with General 
Assembly resolution 1514(XV) and also (2) calling upon the 
Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland not to 
grant independence to Zimbabwe unless it was preceded by 
the establishment of a government based on free elections by 
universal adult suffrage and on majority rule. 
On July 15, 1970, Nigeria joined representatives of 
40 member states in requesting an urgent meeting of the 
Security Council to resume consideration of the question of 
race conflict in South Africa-resulting from the policies of 
apartheid with a view to examining the violations of the 
8l 
arms embargo called for in Security Council Resolutions. 
The Security Council considered the matter between 
July 17 and 23 and adopted a resolution: (1) reiterating 
its total opposition to the policies of apartheid; (2) con- 
79
A/PV, 1692. 
80Resolution 2379 (XXIII). 
0-1 
Y.U.N., 1964, pp. 119-120, text of resolution 191 
(1964). 
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demning the violations of the arms embargo and (3) calling 
upon all states to strengthen the arms embargo. The votes 
Op 
were 12 to 0, with 3 abstentions (U.K., France and U.S.). 
On October 8, 1970, a 52-power draft resolution by 
which the General Assembly would call for full implementation 
of the arms embargo was put before the Special Political 
Committee. Nigeria co-sponsored this draft resolution8® 
which subsequently received an overwhelming approval by roll- 
call vote of 98 to 2, with 9 abstentions. In an emotional 
appeal to member states before the vote was taken, Mr. Edwin 
Ogbu, the Nigerian representative declared, 
My delegation believes that no member of the United 
Nations ought to aid or abet the South African 
racists in their criminal adventures. Therefore, 
on behalf of my delegation and all African dele¬ 
gates, I appeal to all states to enforce fully 
and sincerelyg^he arms embargo imposed by this 
organization. 
At a plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 
October 23, 1970, proposals made by the Ambassador of 
Somalia that the credentials Committee be requested under 
rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly to examine 
the credentials of the representatives of apartheid South 
O £ 
Africa, received a very strong endorsement from Nigeria. ^ 
Mr. Edwin Ogbu called it "a crime against humanity, and the 
Op 
Security Council Resolution 282 (1970). 
8®A/SPC/L. 182. 
84 T, . . Ibid. 
^General Assembly Resolution 2636 (XXY). 
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United Nations, by keeping quiet or by continuing to allow 
this (South African) delegation-which unfortunately sits 
close to Somalia, making it very uncomfortable for them.... 
To continue to sit here is tantamount to condoning a crime 
which is being committed against our brothers in Southern 
86 Africa." Although this endeavour did not result in the 
expulsion of South Africa from the world body, it featured 
a very strong condemnation of her policies and, according to 
the President of the General Assembly, "constitute CO a very 
solemn warning to that government."8^ 
As regards Zimbabwe, representatives of 39 African 
member states including Nigeria requested an urgent meeting 
of the Security Council on March 6, 1970» to consider a so 
called proclamation of Republic by the illegal regime of 
OO 
Ian Smith. The African states expressed disappointment 
at what they viewed as limited nature of the action re¬ 
quested by the United Kingdom in an effort to unseat the 
illegal regime. In a meeting held by the Security Council 
on 18th March, the Council reaffirmed its resolution 216 
(1965) which condemned Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of 
independence. It also condemned his illegal proclamation of 






from recognizing this illegal regime or from rendering any 
assistance to it; and reaffirmed the primary responsibility 
of the government of the United Kingdom to enable the 
people of Zimbabwe to exercise their rights to self 
determination and independence.®9 
In relation to Namibia, the Security Council adopted 
qO 
three resolutions in 19707 as a result of requests from 
91 Nigeria and other member states, asking the Security 
Council to prevail on states having economic and other 
interests in Namibia to refrain from any dealings with South 
Africa. 
92 In addition, Nigeria co-sponsored a draft resolution7 
condemning the support given to South Africa in pursuit of 
its repressive policies in Namibia by the allies of South 
Africa and in particular, by its major trading partners, and 
financial, economic and other interests operating in the 
country. In a roll-call vote taken on December 9, 1970, 
the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by 95 to 5» 
, 93 
with 14 abstentions. 
On October 30, 1972, Nigeria introduced a draft re¬ 
solution in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. on 
"the situation in South Africa resulting from the policies 
^Resolution 277 (1970). 
9°276 (1970); 283 (1970); and 284 (1970). 
91S/96l6 and Add. 1-3• 
92A/C.4/L. 964. 
93 
General Assembly Resolution 2678 (XXV). 
of Apartheid. It was approved by the Committee on November 
1 by a roll-call vote of 96 "to 3 with 21 abstentions. The 
same resolution was adopted by the Plenary on November 15 
by a roll-call vote of 100 to 4 with 21 abstentions.^ 
In 19?4, Nigeria fought together, though without 
success, with 41 other African countries for the expulsion 
of South Africa from the United Nations. Although the African 
move was unsuccessful, it resulted in a major policy speech 
by the South African delegates, Mr. Roelof Botha, who said 
that his country would do "everything in our power to move 
away from discrimination based on race or colour."7^ Although 
the South African Government did not honor its promise, Mr. 
Botha's statement was nothing short of an admission of guilt. 
However it was during the Muhammed/Obasanjo adminis¬ 
trations that Nigeria's unyielding anti-racialist attitude 
assumed a greater momentum at the United Nations. Deeply 
shocked over the large scale killings and wounding of Africans 
in Soweto (a black township outside Johannesburg in South 
Africa), following the callous shooting of African people 
including school children demonstrating against racial dis¬ 
crimination on June 16, 1976, the Nigerian delegation to the 
Thirty-first session of the U.N. General Assembly introduced 
a draft resolution entitled "Economic Collaboration with South 
94 
U.S. Participation in the U.N., Repeal on the United 
Nation, 1972 (Department of State Publication, 1972), p. 162. 
7^A. R.B. (October 1-31. 1974), p. 4311. 
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Africa," which was eventually sponsored by 63 states.9^ The 
resolution in part, emphasized that (1) any collaboration 
with South Africa constitutes a hostile act against the 
oppressed people of South Africa, (2) condemned in strong 
terms, the actions of those states that continued to 
collaborate with South Africa and (3) called on member states 
to refrain forthwith from any economic collaboration with 
South Africa and to prohibit investments in that country. 
In his comments on South Africa's behavior, Brigadier 
Garba declared, 
We shall never relent until the South African 
racists appreciate that such abuse of power, 
such degradation of human values, cannot stand 
the test of time. We in Nigeria are convinced 
that the genocide being perpetrated by the racist 
regime in South Africa, to which some powerful 
members of this assembly continue to turn a blind 
eye, cannot solve in perpetuity the basic problems 
of human resistance and reaction to suffering.97 
The resolution was adopted overwhelmingly by 110 votes to 6 
Q8 
against, with 24 abstentions. Eleven other resolutions 
condemning South Africa were adopted during this session and 
all received affirmative votes from Nigeria. 
Another incident that engaged international attention 
was the establishment of a so called "Transkei state" by the 
96Ibid. (June 1-31, 1976), p. 4062. 76 people died 
and about 1139, wounded during the Soweto incident (Times of 




Republic of South Africa. Such a South African artificially 
created African state within the Republic was nothing short 
of a concentration camp for Africans herded together because 
of the color of their skin. When South Africa granted in¬ 
dependence to Transkei on October 26, 1976, there was an 
almost universal condemnation of Mr. Vorster's racist 
manoeuvres. The United Nations General Assembly approved a 
resolution (U.N. General Assembly Res/3l/6A) coinciding with 
the start of the U.N.'s annual debate on apartheid, which 
declared invalid, the independence granted to the Transkei. 
Of the 135 delegates that were present during the debate, it 
was only the U.S. which abstained on the grounds that it 
could not support a provision asking states to prohibit 
individuals or corporations from having dealings with Transkei. 
This resolution was introduced by Nigerian representative 
Mr. Leslie Harriman, who referred to the Transkei independence 
day as "a dark day, a day of mourning in much of Africa." 
The Nigerian resolution, after recalling a 1975 re¬ 
solution condemning the establishment of bantustans by the 
racist regimes of South Africa, (1) Strongly condemned the 
establishment of bantustans as "designed to consolidate the 
inhuman policies of apartheid, to destroy the territorial 
integrity of the country, to perpetuate white minority 
domination, and to dispossess the African people of South 
Africa of their inalienable rights; (2) Rejected the validity 
of the declaration of independence of Transkei; (3) Called 
on all governments to deny recognition to and refrain from 
any dealings with the so-called independent Transkei; 
(4) Asked all states to prohibit all those under their 
jurisdiction from having any dealings with the Transkei. In 
the end, no country accorded recognition to the Transkei 
except the Republic of South Africa. 
The Namibia question received more serious attention 
of the U.N. in 1976. Nigeria co-sponsored eight draft re¬ 
solutions in the General Assembly that year condemning the 
QQ 
illegal occupation of the territory by South Africa. y In 
the face of increasing international pressure, South Africa 
had arranged in 1974, for various "population groups" of 
Namibia to hold constitutional talks dubbed "Turnhalle 
Conference" that would lead to Namibian independence in 
December 1978.100 This was seen by most members of the U.N. 
including Nigeria as "a fake constitutional conference," 
particularly since it excluded S.W.A.P.O., the authentic 
representatives of the Namibian people.'*"01 The Nigerian 
representative, Brigadier Garba termed the conference "a 
102 
gross insult to the international community." Not even 
Ambassador Moynihan of the United States Government regarded 
the constitutional conference as a "definitive exercise of 
-^Resolutions 31/1^6 through 31/153* 
100Current History (November 1976), pp. 161-164. 
101A/3l/250/Add. 1. 
102 . , 
Ibid. 
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self determination because significant political groups were 
not permitted to participate . "-^3 
On January 30» 1976, the Security Council adopted a 
104 
resolution which set forth specific principles for the 
Namibian settlement. The substantive elements of that re¬ 
solution include: (1) free elections under U.N. supervision 
and control for the whole of Namibia as one political entity; 
(2) adequate time, to be determined by the Security Council, 
to enable the U.N. to establish electoral oversight machinery 
and to enable the Namibian people to organize politically 
for elections; (3) South African withdrawal and the transfer 
of power to the Namibian people with the assistance of the 
United Nations; (4) release of all Namibian political 
prisoners including those detained in either Namibia or South 
Africa for violations of the internal security laws; (5) re¬ 
peal of all discriminatory laws and regulations and dele¬ 
tion of the system of bantustans in Namibia; and (6) un¬ 
hindered return of Namibian exiles without fear of in¬ 
timidating arrest, detention or imprisonment."'-0^ 
Although the Western members of the Security Council 
(France, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany and the U.S.) 






certed in March and April 1977 to "develop a unified approach 
to exploratory talks with the Government of South Africa" on 
the Namibian future.'*'0^ However, their efforts proved 
abortive due to South Africa's intransigence over the in¬ 
dependence date and time of elections; the registration of 
voters and the size and composition of U.N. peace-keeping 
force. 
The Thirty-second session of the General Assembly was 
also dominated by Zimbabwian issues. Nigeria co-sponsored 
two draft resolutions which got the approval of the General 
T A O 
Assembly. The first resolution (32/116A), approved on 
December 16, 1977» (1) reaffirmed the legitimacy of the self 
determination struggle of the people of Zimbabwe by all means 
at their disposal as set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations; (2) demanded an end to repression by the Salisbury 
Regime, the unconditional release of all Zimbabwian political 
prisoners, the end of foreign immigration to Zimbabwe and 
the withdrawal of all mercenaries serving there; (3) called 
on all states to prevent the advertisement for and recruit¬ 
ment of mercenaries for service in Zimbabwe; and (4) requested 
all states to assist Mozambique and Botswana to strengthen 
their defense capabilities. 
106Nigeria at the U.N. (1978), p. 9* 
10^Africa, No. 85 (September, 1978). 
108 
’Resolution 32/lléA; 32/116B. 
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The second resolution,109 also adopted on the 16th of 
December, (1) condemned the policies of those governments, 
particularly that of South Africa, which continue to 
collaborate with the Smith regime and enable it to evade U.N. 
sanctions; (2) called upon all states to prevent their 
corporations from violating sanctions against Zimbabwe; 
(3) requested the Security Council to consider the expansion 
of sanctions against Zimbabwe; and (4) requested the Security 
Council to impose a mandatory oil embargo on South Africa. 
Meanwhile, Britain and U.S. came up with an "Anglo- 
American package" designed to "provide an electoral situation 
(in Zimbabwe) where the most popular figure can win."110 
Although this plan had the backing of Nigeria and the front 
line states,111 it was grounded by inaction on the part of 
both Mr. Smith and the initiators, allowing the former an 
ample opportunity for dubious manouevres that led to his 
112 
"internal settlement" arrangements which also proved un¬ 
workable . 
The Thirty Third Session of the U.N. was dominated by 
Ian Smith's "Internal Settlement" proposal which was regarded 
by most members except the Western nations as duplicity and 
10932/ll6B. 
110New African Development No. 125 (January 1978), 
p. 19. For the basic elements of the proposal, see U.S. 
Participation in the U.N., p. 249. 
111Refer to p. 116. 
112Refer to p. 11?. 
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hypocricy of the white minority rulers of Zimbabwe. Nigeria 
rejected the proposal and became a party to a resolution 
sponsored by seven African and non-aligned members in the 
Security Council. The resolution condemned "all attempts 
and manoeuvres" by the Ian Smith regime "aimed at the re¬ 
tention of power by a racist minority. It also declared 
that the speedy termination of the illegal regime and the 
replacement of its military and police forces was the first 
1] 2 prerequisite for the restoration of legality in Zimbabwe. 
Between 196? and 1979» a total of 210 draft resolutions 
were introduced in the United Nations General Assembly con¬ 
demning Southern African apartheid system and colonialism. 
Out of this number, Nigeria sponsored or co-sponsored 180 
(85.7 percent). Also, out of a total number of 150 votes 
taken within this period, Nigeria recorded 150 affirmative 
114 
votes condemning Southern African minority regimes. 
For all of Nigeria's anti-racialist stand therefore, 
it is very significant that on October 11, 1978, a gold medal 
and a citation were awarded to Mrs. Murtala Muhammed on behalf 
of her husband by the Secretary General of the U.N., His 
Excellency Kurt Waldheim, "for his (Muhammed1s) distinquished 
113A.R.B., March 1-31, 1978, p. 4790. 
114 Summary of resolutions and votes is adopted from 
(a) United Nations Year Book, 1967-1975; (8) United Nations 
General Assembly Official Records, Plenary meetings, and 
Special Political Committee Meetings (United Nations, New 
York, 1967-1977). 
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service in the struggle against apartheid." This was in 
accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/6G of November 
9, 1976 which authorized the Special Committee against 
Apartheid "to establish an award to be presented to persons 
who have, in cooperation with the U.N. and in solidarity 
with the South African liberation movements, contributed 
significantly to the international campaign against 
apartheid. 
The O.A.U. 
During the Nigerian Civil War, the Federal Military 
Government succeeded in winning a commitment from the O.A.U. 
that it would support Nigeria's endeavor to maintain its 
territorial integrity. The actions of the O.A.U. was con¬ 
sistent with the Organization's principle of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of member states and its commitment 
to the territorial status quo of independent African states. 
The O.A.U. support for a United Nigeria certainly 
limited the degree of the internationalization of the con¬ 
flict and eventually contributed to Biafran surrender. There- 
115 Other recipients of the awards were the late Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah former President of Ghana, and the late Ikndit 
Nehru of India (See "Record of the Special meeting of the 
General Assembly for the International Anti-Apartheid Year 
and presentation of awards for distinguished service in the 
struggle against Apartheid, 11th October, 1978" in Solidarity 
With the Oppressed People of South Africa published by the 
United Nation Centre Against Apartheid, Department of 
Political and Security Council Affairs, November, 1978. 
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fore at the end of the war, Nigeria became quite deeply 
commited to the principles of the O.A.U. charter and the 
use of the O.A.U. as a forum for the propagation of its 
foreign policy. 
Like the United Nations, the O.A.U. continued to deal 
with the struggle against colonialism in Zimbabwe, illegal 
occupation of Namibia, racist domination of South Africa, and 
the ruthless suppression of any attempt by the African 
populations of the Portuguese African territories to claim 
the right to self determination. 
In December 1970, an emergency meeting of the 
Organization of African Unity Ministerial Council was held 
in Lagos, Nigeria to consider the attempted invasion of Guinea 
110 by Portugal on November 22, 197°. The meeting was first 
addressed by the Nigerian leader General Yakubu Gowon who 
advised against "long debates and resolutions" and urged 
members to determine how best to assist Guinea "without delay, 
117 in a concrete manner," to repel the invading forces. Three 
main items on the agenda were: (1) The means of helping 
Guinea to safeguard its sovereignty and integrity from any 
future attack; (b) The means of protecting African states 
from any new foreign aggression; and (c) The pursuit of the 
For detailed account of the invasion, see Africa 
Contemporary Record, 1970-1971 (London: Rex Collings, 
1972), pp. B365-B371. 
11?Resolution CM/Res. 17 (VII) and CM/18 (VII). 
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task of liberating those territories still under foreign 
domination, and measures to outlaw the use of mercenaries. 
It was decided that member states should provide immediate 
bilateral aid to the Republic of Guinea so as to enable it 
to face the consequence of aggression. But more importantly, 
the O.A.U. agreed to set up a special O.A.U. fund to provide 
lift 
financial, military and technical assistance to Guinea. 
Another major Southern African issue dominated the 
attention of the O.A.U. in 19?1* This was South Africa's 
proposal for a dialogue with independent African countries. 
The South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster had indicated 
that he was prepared to enter into a treaty or a non-aggres¬ 
sion pact with African states. However there was no indication 
of any attitudinal change in regard to his apartheid policy. 
Albeit, certain African countries led by Ivory Coast welcomed 
his initiatives on the ground that "in a confrontation (with 
South Africa), Black Africa would lose hands down and it is 
therefore pointless to try." y Their views can be summarized 
thus: (a) The armed struggle of the national liberation 
movements had failed; (b) The African states did not possess 
the military and economic resources to challenge South 
Africa decisively; (c) The trade embargo was certain to fail: 
118ibid. 
119 
West Africa (June 18, 1971), p. 638. 
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non-African powers, including the U.S.A., Britain, France, 
West Germany and Japan would net stop trading with South 
Africa, and a number of African states could not afford to 
do so; (d) If the Independent African states engaged in a 
dialogue with the South African Government, this would 
encourage moderate white opinion and influencial business 
pressure groups within South Africa to make peace with the 
Black majority and put an end to apartheid. Alternatively 
it might bring about a change in the South African regime 
itself by methods which only those who live in the country 
120 could legitimately use. 
Nigeria and Ethiopia took the first step in condemning 
the dialogue policy. General Gowon of Nigeria and Emperor 
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia met in May 1971 and laid down the 
O.A.U. guiding principles for dealing with the issue. Both 
men released a joint communique on May 8, 1971 stating that 
there could be no meaningful dialogue which was not based on 
respect for human equality and dignity consistent with the 
Lusaka manifesto. General Gowon reiterated this at a 
banquet given for him by President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya 
when he warned, 
...it will be a great betrayal if we only pay lip 
service to the cause of liberation of the people 
of South Africa, or if we assume that we can 
"*"20Peter Enahoro ,"Dialogue ," Africa No. 2 (London) 
(July 1971), P- 15- 
^2^Press Release by the Federal Ministry of Information, 
No. 46 (May 12, 1971). The Text of the Manifesto was published 
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restore their dignity by bargaining on economic or 
other selfish grounds with their oppressors. He 
declared, "Nigeria will not be a party to any 
dialogue with those whose only aim is to divide 
our ranks and subjugate our brothers, forever, 
in servitude and degradation.... 122 
Dr. Arikpo, then the Nigerian Commissioner for External 
Affairs called the South African initiatives, "insincere, 
dubious and mischievous," and stated that "apart from the 
suspect nature of the offer, it had been made by a government 
123 
which was not the legal representative of South Africa." v 
On his insistence, the item was placed on the agenda of the 
O.A.U. Council of Ministers' Conference held in June, 1971* 
Several African countries led by Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Tanzania vehemently condemned any dialogue with South Africa, 
saying that such an action was against the charter of the 
O.A.U. 
In the end, a resolution was passed by the Ministerial 
Council stating that there was no basis for a meaningful 
dialogue with South Africa and also reaffirming the Organi¬ 
zation's determination to continue rendering its assistance 
to the liberation movements until victory was achieved. The 
resolution was passed by 27 votes to 10 and with 4 absten- 
. . 124 
tions. 
Under General Yakubu Gowon who was Nigeria's Head of 
as U.N. Document, U.N./93 (137) (February 23, 1972). 
122 Ibid. 
123A.C.R. (1971), P- B422. 
12/+CM/st. 5 (XVII, 1971). 
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State from July 1966 to 1975* Nigeria increased its role 
among African states within the O.A.U. in matters concerning 
South African apartheidfand proposed Anglo-Zimbabwian settle¬ 
ments and other anti-colonial proposals. However, with the 
emergence of General Murtala Muhammed and later General 
Obasanjo, as Nigeria's Heads of State in 1975 and 1976 re¬ 
spectively, Nigeria's leadership role in the O.A.U. 
particularly in its initiatives to settle the Anglo-Zimbabwian 
issues, became very conspicuous. Obviously there is no 
better statement which clarifies Nigeria's more activist 
and militant African policy than the one made by General 
Muhammed at the Extra-ordinary Summit Conference of the 
O.A.U., held in Addis Ababa in January 1976, to discuss the 
crisis in Angola in which he asserted, 
Africa has come of age. It is no longer under the 
orbit of any extra continental power. It should 
no longer take orders from any country however 
powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our 
hands to make or mar. For too long have we 
been treated like adolescents who cannot dis¬ 
cern their interests and act accordingly. For 
too long has it been presumed that the African 
needs outside "experts" to tell him who are his 
friends and who are his enemies. 
The time has come when we should make it clear 
that we can decide for ourselves; that we know 
our own interests and how to protect those in¬ 
terests; that we are capable of resolving 
African problems without presumptuous lessons 
in ideological dangers, which more often than 
not have no relevance for us nor for the problem 
at hand.125 
125 
Federal Nigeria 1:1 (October-December, 1976), p. 19* 
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The Angolan crisis provided the first real challenge 
to Nigeria's new direction in Southern African policy and 
its utilization of the O.A.U. to demonstrate this new 
direction. Thus its first stand was that taken in support 
of the O.A.U. line in favor of reconciliation and national 
unity in Angola. But later, it came out in support of the 
MPLA and very actively convinced other African states to 
recognize that nationalist group as Angola's sole re¬ 
presentative. The first emergency summit conference of the 
O.A.U., held in Addis Ababa from January 10-12, 1976 to 
12 & 
discuss the Angolan situation ended in a deadlock. But 
when Nigeria took the lead in according its recognition to 
MPLA, majority of African countries, who argued against such 
127 
a move reversed their position. Hence on February 11, 
1976, the O.A.U. officially recognized the MPLA proclaimed 
12 8 People’s Republic of Angola as a member of the Organization. 
During the same year, the O.A.U. Council of Ministers 
12 8 
°22 countries including Nigeria voted for the 
recognition of MPLA while 22 countries voted for the re¬ 
conciliation of the three contending parties. The rest 
were neutral. (See Africa Research Bulletin (June 1-30, 
1976), p. 3883. 
127ihe Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs held 
consultations with some African Heads of State before Nigeria's 
recognition of the MPLA. (See Ministry of Information Re¬ 
lease No. 1538, December 1, 1978). 
12 8 
'A.C.R. (1975-1976), p. B799. 
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unanimously adopted a resolution condemning New Zealand for 
participating in sporting activities with Southern Africa and 
also called on all members of the organization to reconsider 
their participation in that year's games in Canada if New 
Zealand was not prevailed upon by the I.O.C. to abstain.'*'29 
Nigeria's decision to pull out marked the beginning of the 
withdrawal of other O.A.U. members as New Zealand defiantly 
participated in the games. Shortly afterwards, Nigeria 
re-echoed in the O.A.U., its disapproval of the Anglo- 
American efforts to reach a settlement in Zimbabwe without 
the prior consent of majority of the Zimbabwians. Nigerians 
position, which was also that of the O.A.U., was adopted 
after it became clear that Britain and the U.S. were un¬ 
willing to stand solidly behind their proposals. A re¬ 
solution was therefore passed by the O.A.U. calling on member 
130 
states to reject the British American plans. 
Several other O.A.U. resolutions of Southern Africa 
gained the active support of Murtala/Obasanjo Administrations. 
Some of these dealt with Namibia (C.M./Res. 629 (XXXI), 1978)» 
Sanctions Against the Minority regimes of Southern Africa 
(C.M./Res. 623 (XXXI) and Special Resolution on Sanctions 
Against the Smith Regime (Assembly of Heads of Government 
(AHG/Res. 89 (XV). 
129CM/Res./488 (XXVII), 1976. 
13°A.C.I. (1978-1979), PP- C5-6. 
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On the whole, Nigeria’s deep commitment to gain 
Southern Africa’s liberation through the medium of the 
O.A.U. and on the basis of its activities outside the 
organization, earned her much admiration from Afro Asian 
countries. In applauding the country's significant stand 
at a press conference in Helsinki, Finland in 1976, 
President Julius Nyerere who is one of the outstanding fighters 
against the oppression of the blacks in Southern Africa said, 
"We (Tanzanians) feel a closeness to Nigeria although the 
131 
neighborliness is more spiritual than geographical. ^ Also, 
while the Pakistani Government, through its ambassador in 
Nigeria in 1976, praised "the excellent vanguard role" 
played by Nigeria in the fight against racism "in all its 
form" in Southern Africa, the Vice Premier of the Democratic 
Republic of North Korea, in his remarks while leading a ten- 
man delegation to Nigeria, expressed his country's happiness 
132 
over Nigeria's leadership" in Africa. 
"'"'^Ministry of Information Release, No. 6l4 (May 19» 
1976). 
132 Daily Sketch (Nigeria) (January 24, 1977). p. 3* 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND UPDATE ON THE POST 
MILITARY REGIME 
On the basis of the data presented in this study, it 
is evident that there are significant differences between 
the African policy of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (I96O- 
I966) and that of the subsequent regimes (1967-1979)* For 
instance, whereas, Sir Abubakar’s regime was obsessively 
preoccupied with pro-Western tendencies which led to 
numerous compromises in its stand against apartheid and 
colonialism in Southern Africa, the post Abubakar regimes 
placed greater emphasis on independence in the conduct of 
their foreign relations. Secondly while the late Prime 
Minister’s Southern African policy had been passive and 
characterised by caution and conservatism, the subsequent 
regimes were more assertive and played a more dynamic role in 
their relations with that region. 
Thirdly, it is important to mention that the Abubakar 
regime occasionally gave in to the aspirations of radical 
elements in Nigeria by adopting a tough stand against the 
racist trio in Southern Africa. But this position had always 
been reversed to avoid any circumstances where confrontation 
or antagonizing the West was potential. This made the 
country’s external behavior seem inconsistent and incompre¬ 
hensible . 
Conversely events have shown that the post Abubakar 
regimes never yielded ground to blackmail or intimidation in 
regard to their policies vis-a-vis Southern Africa. One 
glaring instance contained in this study was the rebuff by 
General Murtala Muhammed of the "arm-twisting" mission sent 
by President Ford early in 1976, to protest Russian and 
Cuban presence in Africa. In addition, Nigeria during the 
Muhammed/Obasanjo administration was one of the first African 
countries to recognize the MPLA Government of Angola against 
the wishes of the Western nations. 
It may be necessary to mention that Nigeria's record 
in the U.N. and O.A.U. during Sir Abubakar's regime was 
nearly as good as that of subsequent regimes as the data in 
this study indicate. However there was a yawning difference 
between what his administration's record said and what his 
administration actually did about the country's external 
environment. For instance, on one hand his administration 
voted in the U.N. for an immediate termination of colonialism 
in Southern Africa, while on the other hand, it introduced 
a resolution in 1961 calling for complete independence of 
all African countries by 1970, meaning ten years later. 
This same government also voted against the expulsion of 
South Africa from the U.N. despite its verbal battles against 
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that racist regime.1 
Several observations can be made in regard to the trend 
and development of Nigeria's Southern African relations based 
on the analysis of the factors already identified as the 
determinants of the country's African policy. In the first 
place, its foreign policy process, like that of any state 
reflects (1) The quality and quantity of capabilities at its 
disposal (2) Skill in mobilizing these capabilities in 
support of foreign policy objectives (3) The credibility of 
threats (4) The degree of need or dependence, and (5) The 
2 
degree of responsiveness from the target country. 
Certainly during Abubakar's regime, the capabilities 
within his disposal were not very strong. For instance, 
although the country was blessed with mineral resources, its 
economy was still very poor and underdeveloped. Its military 
establishment was meagre compared with that of other regional 
powers like Egypt, South Africa and Brazil. Above all, 
Abubakar's leadership was faced with internal and external 
constraints which made skillful mobilization of any amount of 
capabilities, a "wild goose chase." His leadership problems 
could be better understood from Rosenau's postulation, that, 
"domestic sources of foreign policy are not less crucial to 
its content and conduct than are the international situations 
^For all the inconsistencies of Sir Abubakar's 
administration, refer to pp. 51-55 and 78-85 of this study. 
p 
Holsti, op. cit. , p. 176. 
14? 
3 
toward which they are directed." Sir Abubakar's predicament 
is understandable in view of Nigeria's ethnic and cultural 
heterogeneity, complicated by tribally and regionally based 
political parties, and a federal structure that institution¬ 
alized regionalism and ethnicity. 
Although the post Balewa regimes could not eradicate 
tribalism, they were able to centralize the Nigerian 
political system, redefine the powers and functions of state 
governments, and concentrate overriding powers in the hands 
of the central government, therefore making the country's 
foreign policy more comprehensible. Thus, Howard Lentner 
made a point when he said that "the reorganization on two or 
three occasions of Nigeria's federal system marks another 
example of structural changes that made a difference in 
foreign policy decision making."^ 
Sir Abubakar's regime was also faced with external 
constraints which were mostly rooted in Nigeria's colonial 
history and legacies. On independence, the British be¬ 
queathed to Nigeria, elements of her educational, adminis¬ 
trative, legal and financial systems. Its economy became 
structurally tied to the Western countries. Understandably 
the regime wished to avoid any circumstances which might 
lead to antagonism or confrontation with the West. As a 
3 
James N. Eosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 2. 
^Howard Lentner, op. cit., p. 196. 
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result of Nigeria's vulnerability to the West, it lacked the 
ability to mobilize its capabilities in support of its foreign 
policy objectives. Therefore any attempt to employ threat 
or blackmail to influence the outcome of events in Southern 
Africa would lack credibility. It would therefore elicit a 
negative response from the target countries. 
However the emergence of oil as a predominant factor 
in the Nigerian economy during the 1970s added immense 
credibility to Nigeria's capabilities. With the rapid eco¬ 
nomic growth of the post Balewa era and Nigeria's ability 
to use oil as a weapon against oil-hungry Western nations, 
the West's paternal attitude towards Nigeria changed con¬ 
siderably. The post Abubakar regimes continued socio-eco¬ 
nomic association with both the East and the West. However 
General Gowon made it clear that "any deliberate attempt to 
establish areas of influence will negate the prime objec¬ 
tive."^ By this statement, he was sounding a note of 
warning to countries that might tamper with Nigeria's 
sovereignty and all its ramifications. 
Furthermore, Nigeria's modest military capability 
during the first republic might have been a factor in its 
low profile foreign policy posture. However as its potential 
increased after the civil war, there was increased reliance 
on the military strength for African policy decisions. The 
^"Army Won't Hand Over in Chaos," Nigerian Round Up 
1:1 (February 23* 197°)» P- 2. 
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theoretical implication of this is obvious. To quote David 
Wilkinson, "a potential of military and economic capabilities 
Cor a state~| much larger than those actually possessed may 
promote long term planning and a shift in foreign policy 
£ 
concerns away from immediate gratification. Therefore, 
like the increased economic capabilities and dynamic politi¬ 
cal leadership of the post Balewa administrations, increased 
military power may also explain Nigeria's more dynamic role 
in Southern African issues. General Obasanjo did not mince 
words about his confidence in Nigeria's increasing role 
against colonialism and apartheid when in 1977, he urged 
Nigerian soldiers to be prepared for "greater sacrifice" in 
South Africa. The former Nigerian Head of State said that 
the Southern African problem was "entering a crucial state," 
adding, "This is the time we can give our moral, financial 
O 
and national support to the oppressed people." 
Finally, as a result of the civil war, the military 
regimes diversified their contacts with the outside world. 
They concluded new trade, cultural and economic agreements 
with the Communist bloc including the Soviet Union, Poland, 
Q 
Rumania Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. 
^David Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 35* 
^West Africa (August 8, 1977)- 
8-,-, • -, Ibid. 
g 
^Gordon Idang, Nigeria: International Politics and 
Foreign Policy, I96O-I966 (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University 
Press, September 1973)» P- 15^* 
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Such contacts improved Nigeria’s relations with these 
countries, thereby minimizing her lukewarm attitude or 
general suspicion of them. With this diversification of 
external relations, Nigeria no longer runs the risks of eco¬ 
nomic blackmail due to total dependence on the Western 
world, nor must she accept foreign policy dictations from 
the West due to such structual dependence. In actuality, 
Nigeria has become a force to reckon with in Africa. This 
opinion was expressed by the former U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations Mr. Andrew Young, who believes that nothing 
can be done in Africa without Nigerian support and while in 
Lagos in August 1977 during an Anti-Apartheid Conference, 
credited the Obasanjo regime with bringing about a "new 
sensitivity of the West" to apartheid and the problems of 
Southern Africa."*"^ 
It is too early to make an accurate evaluation of the 
African policy stance of the present regime headed by Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari. However it could be argued that his regime 
possesses the same basic ingredients which stimulated the 
policy making capability of the military regimes. First, 
the Nineteen-state structure has helped to create an atmos¬ 
phere of unity, co-existence and stability among Nigeria's 
ethnic and linguistic groups. It has also helped weaken the 
monolithic power of the North, thereby fostering a healthy 
balance of power among the various units of the Eepublic. 
10 
African Eesearch Bulletin (August 1-31» 1977)» P* 2. 
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The present federal structure has not only helped to mini¬ 
mize ethnic tensions, hut has also facilitated the recogni¬ 
tion of overall national objectives. In addition, the pre¬ 
sent system which has enhanced the centralization and con¬ 
centration of power and authority in the hands of the federal 
government, gives an increasing impetus to the present admin¬ 
istration to assert its supremacy and exclusive jurisdiction 
in the area of foreign policy. Thus no longer can regional 
authorities encroach on foreign policy preserve of the fed¬ 
eral government nor can any state embark on unilateral foreign 
policy expeditions inimical to the overall national interests. 
The overriding concern with national unity, and the 
prevention of a recurrence of the ethnic-regional cleavages 
that destroyed the first republic gave rise to constitutional 
provisions which stipulate that (1) The national cabinet must 
include a minister from each of the nineteen states and that 
the successful presidential candidate must receive not only 
the most votes but at least one-fourth of the vote in two- 
thirds of the nineteen states.11 Also, political parties 
are nationally rather than ethnically or regionally based in 
order to limit the tribalistic and divisive nature of the 
politics of the first civilian regime which crippled not only 
the domestic aspect but also the international dimension of 
11 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution of the 




the Nigerian politics. 
Secondly, the present regime inherited the economic and 
military capacity of the military regimes. Oil is still 
very prominent in the nation's economy and continues to he 
utilized as an instrument of foreign policy. As regards 
the military, a reduction was made in the strength of the 
army hut this is being made up hy improved equipment in 
consonance with the Obasanjo regime's defense policy which 
prioritized adequate manpower, training, equipment and com- 
13 bat readiness. 
As the largest black nation on earth, Nigeria continues 
to build a powerful defense capability to back up her size 
and positive foreign policy posture. Expressing his views 
in a recent interview in relation to Nigeria's defense 
position, the Nigerian Minister of Defense, Professor Iya 
Abubakar declared, 
I would like to see that we have strong, virile, 
mobile, well-equipped armed forces having modern 
weaponry with sufficient teeth to bite and with . 
adequate fire power to knock out any aggressor. ^ 
In view of the recent uranium find in the country the De¬ 
fense Minister added that it would "guarantee a regular 
supply...to Nigeria's nuclear industry, provide her with an 
additional source of funds for acquiring the other components 
12Ibid., Part III D, Section 301-309- 
~^West Africa (April 9, 1979)» P- 6l6. 
~^West Africa (May 19, 1980), p. 8?4. 
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for nuclear technology and facilitate her negotiations with 
other nuclear powers for cooperation in the development of 
nuclear capabilities.^ 
In the same vein, the idea of the establishment of an 
ECOWAS Defense Force as a regional defense force whose main 
objective is the "maintenance of peace and harmony, terri- 
16 torial integrity, and security in member states," is being 
pushed by Nigeria and is receiving adequate attention through¬ 
out West Africa. Nigeria's leadership role in Africa was 
felt when it spearheaded a move that barred the new Liberian 
Head of State, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe from representing 
his country at the fifth Summit meeting of the ECOWAS held 
17 in Togo in May. Earlier in April, the Nigerian Government 
refused to let Sergeant Doe into Nigeria to attend an O.A.U. 
T 8 
Economic Summit. 
Therefore one could easily surmise that Alhaji Shagari's 
Government will continue with dynamic African policy of the 
military regimes. Interestingly enough, at the on set of 
his regime on October 1, 1979» he indicated that Africa would 
remain the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy.^ He 
"^Ibid. , pp. 873-874. 
1 zT 
Africa Research Bulletin (February 1-29, I98O), 
p. 5568. 
1?Ibid., May 1-30, 1980, p. 5664. 
18 
Nigeria refused to accord recognition to Sergeant Doe's 
Government after he carried out a coup in which President 
Tolbert was killed, Africa Research Bulletin (April 1-30,1980). 
"^The First 100 Days of Mister President (Published by 
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reiterated Nigeria's dedication to rid Africa of racial 
bigotry and the vestiges of colonialism. During the four¬ 
teenth week of his presidency, he named a three member 
Nigerian observer team to participate fully in transitional 
arrangements leading to the final handing over of power to 
a popularly elected government in Zimbabwe. The team was 
led by Mr. Samuel G. Ikoku, former chairman of the Committee 
20 of Action Against Apartheid. 
The President had earlier called on Britain to ensure 
that the election leading to Zimbabwe independence be free 
and fair. In that connection, he suggested the establish¬ 
ment of a peace-keeping force to promote a meaningful cease¬ 
fire operation in Zimbabwe during the election period. Above 
all, some representatives of his administration participated 
in the constitutional talks in London leading to the grant- 
ing of black majority rule to Zimbabwe. It was on the 
basis of the satisfactory outcome of the talks that the 
Nigerian Government, on December 24, 1979» lifted sanctions 
22 earlier imposed on Zimbabwe. 
Looking at the history of the two regimes, it seems 
that Nigeria during its early years did not seem willing to 
the Office of the President: Department of Information 





make demands on other nation states commensurate with its 
position in the world economy, and as a major regime on the 
continent of Africa. However this might be explained by the 
fact that Nigeria was an infant as a nation state and in 
that sense was trying to find its appropriate niche in inter¬ 
national politics. And of course none of the foreign policy 
makers of Nigeria had any experience in this area. But as 
the state and policy makers themselves became more mature 
and confident of their ability to influence other nations, 
and as the objective basis of Nigeria's power changed 
positively, the subsequent regimes were more aggressive in 
making demands on other national actors. Those who envision 
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